European Politics
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bearfan
Ancient Mariner
Interesting:
Unnerved by shaky, debt-ridden countries and bailout packages worth billions, the majority of Germans want the mark back. In a survey conducted in early December by the polling firm Infratest dimap, 57 percent of respondents agreed with the statement that Germany would have been better off keeping the mark than introducing the euro. Germans, it seems, are gripped once again by their historic fear of inflation: According to the Forschungsgruppe Wahlen polling institute, 82 percent of the population is worried about the stability of their currency.
http://www.spiegel.de/international/ger ... 80,00.html
Unnerved by shaky, debt-ridden countries and bailout packages worth billions, the majority of Germans want the mark back. In a survey conducted in early December by the polling firm Infratest dimap, 57 percent of respondents agreed with the statement that Germany would have been better off keeping the mark than introducing the euro. Germans, it seems, are gripped once again by their historic fear of inflation: According to the Forschungsgruppe Wahlen polling institute, 82 percent of the population is worried about the stability of their currency.
http://www.spiegel.de/international/ger ... 80,00.html
Genghis Khan
Ancient Mariner
Germans would know first hand about hyperinflation. They've experienced it; Canadians and Americans are largely unaware of its devastation. I agree that a single currency is a bad idea, but being a skeptic, I don't expect a mostly positive approach if it follows a US tea-party like mixture.
bearfan
Ancient Mariner
that would be an interesting questioin to see asked as well, I would have to think that the Germans would not be very anxious to further tie themselves with countries like Portugal, Greece and some other potential future Euro countries. The risk and costs seem to outweigh the benefits at this point
This is hardly a surprise for me. I don't remember a single poll in which more than 50 or 55% approved of the euro, and I know a lot of people who would rather have the mark back.
Maybe it is difficult to understand for non-Germans, but the general attitude here is that the country's prosperity has dropped significantly during the last twenty years. Germany used to be proud of being one of the richest countries in the world, and the mark was a symbol of its prosperity and its successful reconstruction after the war. Even though many economists and sociologists go to great lengths to demonstrate how Germany is still one of the richest countries in the world and people here are much better off than in around 1960, which is considered something of the golden age when West Germany was a powerhouse that was not struggling with unemployment but workforce shortage. The way the popular tabloid-style media - certainly not the Spiegel which bearfan pointed to, which is one of the best pieces of German media - portray it, reunification brought the German economy down, and now the euro and the European Union is preventing Germany from recovering because "we need to give the money we desperately need ourselves to countries like Greece". Such developments are believed to be a consequence of introducing the euro, and many Germans believe that Germany has given up much sovereignity with the euro, and this point of view is fuelled by the reactionary tabloids. This is in fact going so far as some are starting to demonstrate how the euro was imposed on the Germans by the French as a condition for their approval of reunification.
I can tell you from my own observation over the past few years that the majority of Germans do hate the euro and do want the mark back.
Maybe it is difficult to understand for non-Germans, but the general attitude here is that the country's prosperity has dropped significantly during the last twenty years. Germany used to be proud of being one of the richest countries in the world, and the mark was a symbol of its prosperity and its successful reconstruction after the war. Even though many economists and sociologists go to great lengths to demonstrate how Germany is still one of the richest countries in the world and people here are much better off than in around 1960, which is considered something of the golden age when West Germany was a powerhouse that was not struggling with unemployment but workforce shortage. The way the popular tabloid-style media - certainly not the Spiegel which bearfan pointed to, which is one of the best pieces of German media - portray it, reunification brought the German economy down, and now the euro and the European Union is preventing Germany from recovering because "we need to give the money we desperately need ourselves to countries like Greece". Such developments are believed to be a consequence of introducing the euro, and many Germans believe that Germany has given up much sovereignity with the euro, and this point of view is fuelled by the reactionary tabloids. This is in fact going so far as some are starting to demonstrate how the euro was imposed on the Germans by the French as a condition for their approval of reunification.
I can tell you from my own observation over the past few years that the majority of Germans do hate the euro and do want the mark back.
My opinion on these matters is rather complex, because we are dealing with rather complex matters (now here's a wonderfully palindromic sentence!).
As a historian, I need to point out what I think to be the origin of Germany's economic misery. You see, Germany has been in recession for the last twenty years, ever since reunification. That is an undisputable fact. But that is not the fault of the Euro, and I'm going to lean out a bit further and say that it is not entirely the fault of reunification either.
The origins of Germany's economic crisis have their roots way further in the past. They begin with the mid-1960s, when the upward trend first threatened to stall: The country was reconstructed (note: I am talking solely about West Germany here). Reconstruction was what gave the country its economic boost in the first place, and it was done the way Germans were reputed to do it, efficiently and precise. To compare, the Italians did it more chaotically, which in the long run proved to be more profitable, because they kept their economic boost running much longer that way.
The Germans managed to keep the growth going nevertheless, because they had the significant advantage that "Made in Germany" is something of a quality label. German products have always been reputed to be efficient, robust and of high technical quality; this is the reason why Germany has been the number one exporting country worldwide consistently until only a few years back when China topped it. So, by the 1970s, Germany's economic income relied purely on the profits made from export. This is what caused the economic instability, because the oil crisis of 1973 and 1979 became a significant drawback for the Germans, because they could sell less products on the international market, which drove a million people into unemployment by the end of the 1970s. Despite this however, German profits were still so exorbitantly high the country could afford to pay for the wellfare and maintain its economic growth. Moreover, the number of unemployed stagnated and the Kohl administration employed its own brand of Thatcherian economics that seemed to promise to keep Germany as rich as it was, despite increasing corruption and little economic foresight.
Kohl's lack of foresight came back at him however, when the Berlin Wall fell. You need to consider that there was practically no forewarning; the waves of East German refugees did not appear until the summer of 1989, the mass movements inside East Germany did not start until October, and the Wall fell in November. It was not until that summer that everybody realised that East Germany was bankrupt, which was what made the masses flee in the first place. Kohl, like all other chancellors before him, maintained the long-termed goal that Germany was to be reunified. But nobody had expected that reunification would take place with zero forewarning within a single year (the Wall fell on 9. November 1989, reunification took place on 3. October 1990), and much less that Germany would incorporate such a large territory that was completely run to the ground, economically. By 1992, there was simply nothing in the east that worked efficiently anymore, virtually no factory producing any sort of output. The East German mark was traded in for the West German one at a course of 1:1, while the actual value was not even close to that. The amount of money burned in the process of reunification is stupefying, and the rise of unemployment was horrible; many former East Germans migrated to former West Germany, depopulating entire regions and boosting unemployment in the west. All this could not be paid for by an economy that made profits only from export, and while German produce and exports have actually been rising since reunification -same as profits-, the country fell into a recession it has not recovered from since. Unfortunately, the depopulation of the east has made attempts to reconstruct it fail, mostly, hence creating no new sources for revenue as it had been in West Germany after the war.
The Euro may have actually had the potential to counter these developments and help Germany get back to its feet, if it had been handled properly. The truth is that it was rushed - conceived and introduced within a mere decade - and therefore to this day carries some fatal flaws. The first one is that too much attention had been paid to individual national sentiments. Better said, too much effort was made to emphasise that countries like Portugal, Spain and Greece are part of the European Union. The Euro should have been introduced in stable economies like the BeNeLux, Ireland (at that time), Sweden, Finland, Denmark and major countries like France, Italy and Germany first and then the Euro Zone should have gradually been expanded. While France, Italy and Germany all are suffering from recession, the new currency would have eased investments from other Euro partners without bringing them down, because their economies are still immensely well developed. Other countries should have caught up with that development before being allowed to join.
Then, there is another, much more inexcusable flaw with the Euro. If you are going to have a common currency, you also need a common policy going with it - in other words, one single European department of finances. As it is, all members of the Euro Zone share one currency, but they individually free to do with it what they like. It is like a big family with a single bank account, and everybody is free to draw money from it whenever you like. Nobody does that, you have one single master plan, determining who gets what and when. Let's say you have mom, dad and five kids. Assume the parents earn the money and give each of their kids unlimited access to it at any time, with no efficient control: A month's income would be gone within a day. Nobody in their right mind would manage their family like this. Now imagine this family consists of 17 countries with 327 million people, and there are no lessons to be learned. Some countries know how to deal with this matter responsibly, others don't, and we see the consequences right now. Greece blew a shitload of money and everybody else has to pay. Ireland did the same, Portugal is coming up, and so are Spain and Heaven forbid, Italy.
I am a staunch advocate of European unification, more than anybody else I know, but the way things are handled right now, I would rather blow everything to pieces and start again.
As a historian, I need to point out what I think to be the origin of Germany's economic misery. You see, Germany has been in recession for the last twenty years, ever since reunification. That is an undisputable fact. But that is not the fault of the Euro, and I'm going to lean out a bit further and say that it is not entirely the fault of reunification either.
The origins of Germany's economic crisis have their roots way further in the past. They begin with the mid-1960s, when the upward trend first threatened to stall: The country was reconstructed (note: I am talking solely about West Germany here). Reconstruction was what gave the country its economic boost in the first place, and it was done the way Germans were reputed to do it, efficiently and precise. To compare, the Italians did it more chaotically, which in the long run proved to be more profitable, because they kept their economic boost running much longer that way.
The Germans managed to keep the growth going nevertheless, because they had the significant advantage that "Made in Germany" is something of a quality label. German products have always been reputed to be efficient, robust and of high technical quality; this is the reason why Germany has been the number one exporting country worldwide consistently until only a few years back when China topped it. So, by the 1970s, Germany's economic income relied purely on the profits made from export. This is what caused the economic instability, because the oil crisis of 1973 and 1979 became a significant drawback for the Germans, because they could sell less products on the international market, which drove a million people into unemployment by the end of the 1970s. Despite this however, German profits were still so exorbitantly high the country could afford to pay for the wellfare and maintain its economic growth. Moreover, the number of unemployed stagnated and the Kohl administration employed its own brand of Thatcherian economics that seemed to promise to keep Germany as rich as it was, despite increasing corruption and little economic foresight.
Kohl's lack of foresight came back at him however, when the Berlin Wall fell. You need to consider that there was practically no forewarning; the waves of East German refugees did not appear until the summer of 1989, the mass movements inside East Germany did not start until October, and the Wall fell in November. It was not until that summer that everybody realised that East Germany was bankrupt, which was what made the masses flee in the first place. Kohl, like all other chancellors before him, maintained the long-termed goal that Germany was to be reunified. But nobody had expected that reunification would take place with zero forewarning within a single year (the Wall fell on 9. November 1989, reunification took place on 3. October 1990), and much less that Germany would incorporate such a large territory that was completely run to the ground, economically. By 1992, there was simply nothing in the east that worked efficiently anymore, virtually no factory producing any sort of output. The East German mark was traded in for the West German one at a course of 1:1, while the actual value was not even close to that. The amount of money burned in the process of reunification is stupefying, and the rise of unemployment was horrible; many former East Germans migrated to former West Germany, depopulating entire regions and boosting unemployment in the west. All this could not be paid for by an economy that made profits only from export, and while German produce and exports have actually been rising since reunification -same as profits-, the country fell into a recession it has not recovered from since. Unfortunately, the depopulation of the east has made attempts to reconstruct it fail, mostly, hence creating no new sources for revenue as it had been in West Germany after the war.
The Euro may have actually had the potential to counter these developments and help Germany get back to its feet, if it had been handled properly. The truth is that it was rushed - conceived and introduced within a mere decade - and therefore to this day carries some fatal flaws. The first one is that too much attention had been paid to individual national sentiments. Better said, too much effort was made to emphasise that countries like Portugal, Spain and Greece are part of the European Union. The Euro should have been introduced in stable economies like the BeNeLux, Ireland (at that time), Sweden, Finland, Denmark and major countries like France, Italy and Germany first and then the Euro Zone should have gradually been expanded. While France, Italy and Germany all are suffering from recession, the new currency would have eased investments from other Euro partners without bringing them down, because their economies are still immensely well developed. Other countries should have caught up with that development before being allowed to join.
Then, there is another, much more inexcusable flaw with the Euro. If you are going to have a common currency, you also need a common policy going with it - in other words, one single European department of finances. As it is, all members of the Euro Zone share one currency, but they individually free to do with it what they like. It is like a big family with a single bank account, and everybody is free to draw money from it whenever you like. Nobody does that, you have one single master plan, determining who gets what and when. Let's say you have mom, dad and five kids. Assume the parents earn the money and give each of their kids unlimited access to it at any time, with no efficient control: A month's income would be gone within a day. Nobody in their right mind would manage their family like this. Now imagine this family consists of 17 countries with 327 million people, and there are no lessons to be learned. Some countries know how to deal with this matter responsibly, others don't, and we see the consequences right now. Greece blew a shitload of money and everybody else has to pay. Ireland did the same, Portugal is coming up, and so are Spain and Heaven forbid, Italy.
I am a staunch advocate of European unification, more than anybody else I know, but the way things are handled right now, I would rather blow everything to pieces and start again.
bearfan
Ancient Mariner
I think there is no doubt that the East was in even worse shape than had been thought by the West, what seems to be a failure is a way to integrate the East into the West.
Had the reunification occured in 1960, this might not have been as large of a challenge, but by 1990 East Germany and East Germans were in reality a different country from West Germany and a different people (education, work ethic, national identity) from West Germans. I do not think anyone in government nor most people anticipated such difficulty in reforming Germany into one entity. There is no doubt thattons of money has been poured into the East with less than stellar results.
The Euro being dragged down is a doubly whammy, but I think Perun is dead on that it is a difficult position to being a a majory country in a common currency and allowing countries to run poor policy. For countries teetering on the edge, it is almost better at this point to just take a bailout from the bigger countries.
I visited Eastern Germany and the Czech Republic 18 months ago and it was very obvious when you crossed the old Eastern border just based on the cities and how they looked.
I also wonder how much the old states come into play in this, it seems to be a fallacy to think of Germany as a logn standing country in terms of national identity when it was not until the Nazis that a lot of the state governments and facilities were nationalized (versus Prussians, Franconians, Hessians, Bavarians, etc). But, it has been some time since I studied this and I might be wrong here.
Had the reunification occured in 1960, this might not have been as large of a challenge, but by 1990 East Germany and East Germans were in reality a different country from West Germany and a different people (education, work ethic, national identity) from West Germans. I do not think anyone in government nor most people anticipated such difficulty in reforming Germany into one entity. There is no doubt thattons of money has been poured into the East with less than stellar results.
The Euro being dragged down is a doubly whammy, but I think Perun is dead on that it is a difficult position to being a a majory country in a common currency and allowing countries to run poor policy. For countries teetering on the edge, it is almost better at this point to just take a bailout from the bigger countries.
I visited Eastern Germany and the Czech Republic 18 months ago and it was very obvious when you crossed the old Eastern border just based on the cities and how they looked.
I also wonder how much the old states come into play in this, it seems to be a fallacy to think of Germany as a logn standing country in terms of national identity when it was not until the Nazis that a lot of the state governments and facilities were nationalized (versus Prussians, Franconians, Hessians, Bavarians, etc). But, it has been some time since I studied this and I might be wrong here.
bearfan said:
I think this is true for most average Germans, but if you consider the subventions the Kohl administration granted to the East German government in the end (we are talking about billions here), one is left wondering how much the government did really not know. It was apparent to many of the more critical observers at the time that Kohl was trying his utmost to save the GDR, only taking the credit for reunification when the people took the economic crisis as the spark for revolution.
Back then, there was a long discussion on how to handle reunification. With the benefit of hindsight, you could say the more considerate people were right to think it would have been better to gradually fuse the two countries together and only allow for full unification when the East German state was transformed to a viable market economy, but these discussions were purely theoretical and detached from reality: As soon as the wall had fallen, the people ceased to chant "we are the people" and changed it to "we are one people". There was no other realistic option than to unify the two countries right away, but I am putting the blame on Kohl for sparking unrealistic anticipations in the people. Instead of confronting them with a reality everybody was ready to accept, specifically that the path ahead would be difficult and long, he promised them "blooming landscapes" to appear soon.
The identity of the old countries and tribes is well-remembered and emphasised in Germany, but it plays a negligible part in reality. I heard from many nationals of other European countries like Spain or Italy that they envy Germans for their national identity. Many Germans will say with pride they are from Bavaria, Hamburg, Saxony or, in my case, Berlin, but they will at the same time say they are German. It is true that Germany had a long path to inner unification after 1871, but this particular problem is no longer existant.
bearfan
Ancient Mariner
I understand what you are saying, I am not sure this was a problem with Kohl as much as it would have been with any other Chancellor, it is not common for politicians to throw cold water on great news, especially news symbolized the end of everything bad that happened to Germany post-1945 and what had been at least the stated purpose of West Germany since it's birth.
You are certainly right about that, but it wouldn't have been too much cold water. The people of East Germany knew how run down their country was, and they didn't expect any miracles to happen until Kohl promised them.
It's speculative how other chancellors would have acted. I'm sure Schmidt would have been much more rational, but if things happened in 1979 rather than 89, maybe the crisis would not have been so deep.
It's speculative how other chancellors would have acted. I'm sure Schmidt would have been much more rational, but if things happened in 1979 rather than 89, maybe the crisis would not have been so deep.
bearfan
Ancient Mariner
I find this interesing (I have a degree in History), how much of this is due to East Germans and West Germans having changed so much over 45 years. In 1990, it would have been easier for West Germany to unite with Denmark and East Germany with the Czechs. Beyond the all the economic challenges, what was perhaps understimated the most was the challenge of re-uniting the people as a common people and that may just be a case where it will take a generation or two. It is also an interesting case study of 2 countries which came from exactly the same circumstances in 1945 and how in such a short period of time there were such vast outcomes in the economic quality of life.
I find the idea of a common European finance ministry to be a very interesting (and indeed) compelling one, that may very well need to be the next logical step forward if the Euro is going to remain the going thing.
As for West/East unification, well. It is what it is: an example for South Korea to not want to ever fight and win a war with the North
As for West/East unification, well. It is what it is: an example for South Korea to not want to ever fight and win a war with the North
Recent polls have the governing FDP party down to 4%, meaning it would not enter the parliament if there were elections on Sunday.
They had gotten 14.6% in the 2009 elections, meaning they lost ten per cent in the last 16 months. Reasons are made out to be the lack of promised tax cuts, the policy targeted to specific groups, the party chairman, foreign minister and vice chancellor Guido Westerwelle, and general failure in federal politics.
This development is dramatic, because there are six state elections coming up this year, meaning the governing conservative-liberal coalition would be a minority in the Bundesrat, the upper house of parliament at the end of the year.
If things go well, this may be the end of the FDP as it is, the end of its tyrant Westerwelle, and if I'm allowed to dream, the end of Merkel, that bloody hag.
They had gotten 14.6% in the 2009 elections, meaning they lost ten per cent in the last 16 months. Reasons are made out to be the lack of promised tax cuts, the policy targeted to specific groups, the party chairman, foreign minister and vice chancellor Guido Westerwelle, and general failure in federal politics.
This development is dramatic, because there are six state elections coming up this year, meaning the governing conservative-liberal coalition would be a minority in the Bundesrat, the upper house of parliament at the end of the year.
If things go well, this may be the end of the FDP as it is, the end of its tyrant Westerwelle, and if I'm allowed to dream, the end of Merkel, that bloody hag.
Dr. Eddies Wingman
Brighter than thousand_suns
So, these guys are suffering from the same as the Socialist Left Party in Norway - being a junior party in a coalition government, being overrun by their coalition partners in important issues and thus not being able to deliver what they've promised their voters?
The current Norwegian coallition government between the Norwegian Labour Party, the Centre Party and the Socialist Left Party has been in office since the 2005 election (they were barely re-elected in 2009). The Socialist Left have since 2001 lost half of their voters - going from 12.5% and 25 seats in the parliament, via 8.8% and 15 seats in 2005 to 6.2% and 11 seats in 2009. They lost quite a few voters in 2005 because many of their loyal voters felt they would have to compromise too much on the core principles of the party if they joined a coalition government. (They were formed as a break-away party from Labour in the late 60s, as they wanted Norway to pull out of NATO). Over the last 5 1/2 years there have been several instances of their own grassroot members demonstrating against their participation in the government. They were formed as a protest party and the last 5 years have shown that that's what they still really are. They are not very comfortable in the responsible role.
Their decline pleases me as I have a general distaste for parties who are mainly against stuff and whose political solutions lack realism. Thus it is a major concern that the corresponding party on the right side, the Progress Party, have grown big and are now almost certain to be part of a coalition government, should the non-socialist block win in 2013. I think that will be a wake-up call for many of their voters. They currently hold 41 seats in the parliament (second biggest). The thing is, they've never been in office and they've had the privilege of always criticizing the government, whoever that has been. Basically, they call themselves a liberal party, but they are still in favour of a stricter immigration policy, and want the state to be responsible for welfare. They also like to promise tax cuts of all kinds - and together with a more liberal alcohol policy that's the only issue where they take a really liberal point-of-view. Of course they want to spend oil money on today's welfare budgets to do that, but once they get inside the government building they will - just like the Socialist Left - find out that it's harder to actually steer a country than telling others how to do it.
The current Norwegian coallition government between the Norwegian Labour Party, the Centre Party and the Socialist Left Party has been in office since the 2005 election (they were barely re-elected in 2009). The Socialist Left have since 2001 lost half of their voters - going from 12.5% and 25 seats in the parliament, via 8.8% and 15 seats in 2005 to 6.2% and 11 seats in 2009. They lost quite a few voters in 2005 because many of their loyal voters felt they would have to compromise too much on the core principles of the party if they joined a coalition government. (They were formed as a break-away party from Labour in the late 60s, as they wanted Norway to pull out of NATO). Over the last 5 1/2 years there have been several instances of their own grassroot members demonstrating against their participation in the government. They were formed as a protest party and the last 5 years have shown that that's what they still really are. They are not very comfortable in the responsible role.
Their decline pleases me as I have a general distaste for parties who are mainly against stuff and whose political solutions lack realism. Thus it is a major concern that the corresponding party on the right side, the Progress Party, have grown big and are now almost certain to be part of a coalition government, should the non-socialist block win in 2013. I think that will be a wake-up call for many of their voters. They currently hold 41 seats in the parliament (second biggest). The thing is, they've never been in office and they've had the privilege of always criticizing the government, whoever that has been. Basically, they call themselves a liberal party, but they are still in favour of a stricter immigration policy, and want the state to be responsible for welfare. They also like to promise tax cuts of all kinds - and together with a more liberal alcohol policy that's the only issue where they take a really liberal point-of-view. Of course they want to spend oil money on today's welfare budgets to do that, but once they get inside the government building they will - just like the Socialist Left - find out that it's harder to actually steer a country than telling others how to do it.
Forostar
Ancient Mariner
Belgium grabs record for longest political crisis
That was fun to see people party on TV.
Belgium grabs record for longest political crisis
Belgium on Thursday snatched Iraq's dubious record as the country boasting the world's longest political crisis of recent times, an event to be cheekily marked by a "chips revolution" honouring a favourite national dish.
The nation of 11 million people, home to both the European Union and NATO, hit 249 days of political deadlock after an election last June 13 that failed to produce an outright winner.
Already Europe's longest wait for a government -- beating the Netherlands in 1977 at 208 days -- Thursday sees Belgium out-performing Iraq, where Kurds and Shiite and Sunni Muslims struck a political pact late last year after 249 days, which in December, 40 days later, saw a government sworn in. .. read on
That was fun to see people party on TV.
Belgium grabs record for longest political crisis
Belgium on Thursday snatched Iraq's dubious record as the country boasting the world's longest political crisis of recent times, an event to be cheekily marked by a "chips revolution" honouring a favourite national dish.
The nation of 11 million people, home to both the European Union and NATO, hit 249 days of political deadlock after an election last June 13 that failed to produce an outright winner.
Already Europe's longest wait for a government -- beating the Netherlands in 1977 at 208 days -- Thursday sees Belgium out-performing Iraq, where Kurds and Shiite and Sunni Muslims struck a political pact late last year after 249 days, which in December, 40 days later, saw a government sworn in. .. read on