If it was just Germany vs. USSR there would have been 5 years of fighting in Poland, because neither side would be able to advance much past there.
Worst Mistake in the History of the Human Race
- Thread starter IronDuke
- Start date
I think you're being very generous with the Soviets to say they had better generals. Of course, that's an entirely subjective point. With no western/southern front both Rommel and Kesselring would have been available for the Eastern Front. That alone makes a big difference in terms of generalship. Manstein was no slouch, either. Zhukov and Konev were good generals, especially the former, but the Germans were able, as late as 1943, to do maneuvers that the Russians couldn't match (the Manstein counterattack, for one).
Lend-lease wares came primarily from North America, as I had explained in my post. As Loosey noted, it wasn't weaponry that aided the Soviets the most, but trucks and boots. Trucks aren't tanks and boots aren't greatcoats. Besides, clothes shipped to the Soviet Union weren't British or US army standards, but Red Army standards. I.e. clothes manufactured precisely for the Russian winter.
Barely. The Soviets were starting to gain the upper hand in early 1943, and it was still a long way to go from there. By that time, lend-lease ware had been flowing into the Soviet Union for two years. There had been considerable effort going into industrialisation of the east, and there was heavy weapons production, of course, but it takes time to build factories and weapons. Also, consider that Germany had also been starting to go into the defensive in the west with increased bombing of German cities and industry complexes, not to forget the invasion of North Africa and Italy that I had already mentioned.
Of course the Soviet efforts should and must not be belittled, but it's hardly beneficial to deny they were also reliant on outside help.
Forostar
Ancient Mariner
If the German generals (in Europe) (or their forces for that matter) were as good as the Soviets, one would have expected the Wehrmacht to hold ground more effectively, especially as the front was narrowing.
In the months when the Americans were still girding their loins, the Soviets were already racing towards a position of near-total dominance. One does not need to look further than the second week of 1943. At that point in the war the very first US soldiers set foot in continental Europe (on a distant beach in southern Sicily). At the same time, on the Eastern Front, the Red Army was breaking the Wehrmacht's back to such an extent that the German war machine would never regain its offensive capacity.
Western aid (Lend-Lease) may have been something more than the icing on the cake, but I wouldn't be 100% sure it was the decisive factor.
In the months when the Americans were still girding their loins, the Soviets were already racing towards a position of near-total dominance. One does not need to look further than the second week of 1943. At that point in the war the very first US soldiers set foot in continental Europe (on a distant beach in southern Sicily). At the same time, on the Eastern Front, the Red Army was breaking the Wehrmacht's back to such an extent that the German war machine would never regain its offensive capacity.
Western aid (Lend-Lease) may have been something more than the icing on the cake, but I wouldn't be 100% sure it was the decisive factor.
You're comparing apples to oranges there. By the time the Allies landed in Sicily, they had already driven the Germans out of North Africa, at a time when the Wehrmacht was still on the march in Russia. Also, it helps to compare the geography of Italy to that of Russia and the Ukraine. I mentioned earlier that some historians pinpoint the unsustainability of the front line in the Soviet Union as the reason for German failure. I rejected that notion because it was of no relevance in the initial attack; but by 1943, of course, things had changed dramatically. The Wehrmacht was in absolutely no defensive position in those territories. It was impossible to stand ground on those vast plains. Sure the Red Army swept through the Ukraine between early 1943 and 44, but things looked quite different further to the north. Also, it's not quite true that the Soviets had devastated the Germans in the first two weeks of 1943. The Germans hadn't even capitulated in Stalingrad at that time, although it was obvious they would not win the battle anymore.
By November 1943, the Allies had brought Italy to its knees, and the only reason why fighting continued there was because the Germans sent a major troop surge there - troops that were desperately lacking elsewhere.
However, the real point we're arguing here is:
Maybe the Soviets were more successful on the battlefield than the Western Allies, but how does that prove that aids sent to the Soviet Union in shape of supplies and hardware were not decisive?
Forostar
Ancient Mariner
It does not prove anything indeed. I already edited that last sentence of my previous post. I am not as sure as LC and you that it was decisive.
The Red Army had already gained the upper hand on the Eastern front at the turn of 1942-1943 before the full weight of Western assistance could be felt. The route via Iran indeed ensured that the Red Army lacked for nothing. From late 1943 flowed an uninterrupted stream of goods, but by that moment the Soviets were doing not that bad already. Yes, there were also Arctic convoys (with two gaps with no sailings between July and September 1942, and March and November 1943), but the most aid the Russians got flowed via Iran.
I don't recall the Germans ever capitulated on time.
Forgive me for broadening the discussion -you broad the geography, I broad the discussion
- (and being besides the point from time to time) but one can still question the impact (and tactical choice) of the events in North African you just mentioned. In Churchill's words "the turning of the tide". But he was referring to the tide of Britain's survival. In the broader perspective, El Alamein barely registers as a major event. It did not compare with the recent battle of Midway, where the Americans put an end to Japan's naval supremacy, still less to Stalingrad. After Alamein the supremacy of The Third Reich in Europe was still intact.
I only mentioned Africa/Italy because it tied up 2 of Germany's finest generals who would otherwise have been deployed to Russia. There's a thousand reasons why Germany lost the war, and yes, they were in a really bad spot from the time they got surrounded at Stalingrad. Their defeat was almost inevitable. However, that would not have made it easy.
What I am trying to say is that without US Lend-Lease the USSR wouldn't have been able to advance into actual Germany for a long time. You can have all the tanks in the world, but if you have no trucks to bring up fuel, then those tanks aren't going anywhere anytime soon. The USSR's trucks came almost entirely from the USA.
What I am trying to say is that without US Lend-Lease the USSR wouldn't have been able to advance into actual Germany for a long time. You can have all the tanks in the world, but if you have no trucks to bring up fuel, then those tanks aren't going anywhere anytime soon. The USSR's trucks came almost entirely from the USA.
I think the problem we are having here is that we tend to think of big, decisive battles and spectacular missions when it comes to this and most other wars. In most history books, you will read of the battles of Britain, Stalingrad and Midway as the turning points of the war. It is true that in each of these battles, the winning force was more or less on its own, which gives the impression that they could have won the war more or less on their own. The truth however, is that there was never one single point in the war that brought about the decision. I refer you back to my original post in this particular discussion, where I listed a number of reasons why Germany lost the war. That list hardly even scratches the surface; I merely mentioned the most dramatic ones. In fact, the whole war, from the German invasion of Poland to the nuclear bombing of Nagasaki, is an awesome example of causality that could hardly ever be studied exhaustively.
Since Foro mentioned it, let's take the Battle of El-Alamein as an example. Of course, at first glance, it is difficult to see what a comparatively small battle involving two expedition forces somewhere on the Egyptian border had to do with the proceedings in Russia, Germany or Japan. But the battle and the entire failure of the Afrika Korps had a number of very significant outcomes. The most obvious one is that the Germans failed to achieve a key military objective, the capture of Alexandria and Egypt. Now, Egypt did play a very important geostrategical role for two reasons. It was the gateway to Western Asia with its vast oil fields. The only major oil fields under German control at the time were the ones in Romania, which incidentally later became strategic targets for bombing raids. Early in the war, German agents had attempted to incite a broad revolt in Western Asia against British and French dominance. This became so serious that the British felt compelled to occupy Iraq early in 1941, and could still more or less put the argument of the threat of German agents forward as an apology to invade Iran. The second major strategic role Egypt played was of course its control over the Suez Canal. Even a minor disruption for a few months of the canal would have had drastic consequences on the lifeline between the Mediterranean and the rest of the world, especially because the Gibraltar route was endangered by u-boat activity. But if the Germans had seized control over the Suez Canal, the consequences would have been even more dramatic considering they could have sent their u-boats down the Red Sea and pose a major threat to the Persian Corridor, which as we have already established, was a major lifeline for the Soviets.
So much for the 'if', let's take a look at the 'was'. What did the Allies gain from the German defeat in North Africa? Primarily, they had achieved the first decisive victory over a German ground force in the war. What weighed even more heavily was the fact that it was commanded by Erwin Rommel, no less. Rommel was responsible for the success of the blitzkrieg in Western Europe, and he was a favourite of Hitler's- until this defeat. You could say the Germans lost one of their most able commanders here. Even more importantly however, the German army in Northern Africa had lost the initiative and was on the retreat. It took a while to eliminate it completely, but after El-Alamein, the Germans had lost the military control over the entire region. Only a few weeks after El-Alamein, Allied forces under Eisenhower's command landed in Casablanca and made their way along the coast. By spring of 1943, the Germans had capitulated in Northern Africa and the Allies had the uncontested control over the Mediterranean. Having gained a foothold in Tunisia, they could work their way up Italy in a campaign that was long and with many casualties, but ultimately brought Italy to it's knees and forced German troops there - troops that were now desperately lacking on the East Front and would later be needed once the Allies invaded the Normandy.
The thing is, El-Alamein, like virtually every event in the war, was a cog in the machinery. Some cogs were bigger, some were smaller, but they all interlocked to give the war the progress it took.
Now, let's go back a bit.
I would dispute that. Please explain what you mean by the full weight being felt. What is your source for that anyway? Moreover, as I already said, the Soviets having 'gained the upper hand' really is a very vague statement. It sounds like the Red Army had a cakewalk after driving the Germans out of Stalingrad. True, the Red Army lost no major battle afterwards, but the effort it took was nevertheless tremendous. The Battle of Kursk, resulting from a German counter-offensive, had almost the same scale as that of Stalingrad. The Battle for Berlin was even bigger. Both were triumphant Soviet victories, but they also could have been devastating defeats that would have shifted the balance once again. As Loosey said: German defeat probably was inevitable, but by no means easy.
The Soviets were starting to win the war in part because they could develop their strategies based on the reliability of Allied supplies. What is interesting here is that we have two opposing statements: Loosey said that the Pacific route to Vladivostok was the more important one, Foro says the same thing for the Persian Corridor. I'd be interested in seeing both of your sources for that. Moreover, just because the Pacific route was interrupted twice does not mean that the total of shipped goods on that route was not bigger than those via the Persian Corridor.
Since Foro mentioned it, let's take the Battle of El-Alamein as an example. Of course, at first glance, it is difficult to see what a comparatively small battle involving two expedition forces somewhere on the Egyptian border had to do with the proceedings in Russia, Germany or Japan. But the battle and the entire failure of the Afrika Korps had a number of very significant outcomes. The most obvious one is that the Germans failed to achieve a key military objective, the capture of Alexandria and Egypt. Now, Egypt did play a very important geostrategical role for two reasons. It was the gateway to Western Asia with its vast oil fields. The only major oil fields under German control at the time were the ones in Romania, which incidentally later became strategic targets for bombing raids. Early in the war, German agents had attempted to incite a broad revolt in Western Asia against British and French dominance. This became so serious that the British felt compelled to occupy Iraq early in 1941, and could still more or less put the argument of the threat of German agents forward as an apology to invade Iran. The second major strategic role Egypt played was of course its control over the Suez Canal. Even a minor disruption for a few months of the canal would have had drastic consequences on the lifeline between the Mediterranean and the rest of the world, especially because the Gibraltar route was endangered by u-boat activity. But if the Germans had seized control over the Suez Canal, the consequences would have been even more dramatic considering they could have sent their u-boats down the Red Sea and pose a major threat to the Persian Corridor, which as we have already established, was a major lifeline for the Soviets.
So much for the 'if', let's take a look at the 'was'. What did the Allies gain from the German defeat in North Africa? Primarily, they had achieved the first decisive victory over a German ground force in the war. What weighed even more heavily was the fact that it was commanded by Erwin Rommel, no less. Rommel was responsible for the success of the blitzkrieg in Western Europe, and he was a favourite of Hitler's- until this defeat. You could say the Germans lost one of their most able commanders here. Even more importantly however, the German army in Northern Africa had lost the initiative and was on the retreat. It took a while to eliminate it completely, but after El-Alamein, the Germans had lost the military control over the entire region. Only a few weeks after El-Alamein, Allied forces under Eisenhower's command landed in Casablanca and made their way along the coast. By spring of 1943, the Germans had capitulated in Northern Africa and the Allies had the uncontested control over the Mediterranean. Having gained a foothold in Tunisia, they could work their way up Italy in a campaign that was long and with many casualties, but ultimately brought Italy to it's knees and forced German troops there - troops that were now desperately lacking on the East Front and would later be needed once the Allies invaded the Normandy.
The thing is, El-Alamein, like virtually every event in the war, was a cog in the machinery. Some cogs were bigger, some were smaller, but they all interlocked to give the war the progress it took.
Now, let's go back a bit.
I would dispute that. Please explain what you mean by the full weight being felt. What is your source for that anyway? Moreover, as I already said, the Soviets having 'gained the upper hand' really is a very vague statement. It sounds like the Red Army had a cakewalk after driving the Germans out of Stalingrad. True, the Red Army lost no major battle afterwards, but the effort it took was nevertheless tremendous. The Battle of Kursk, resulting from a German counter-offensive, had almost the same scale as that of Stalingrad. The Battle for Berlin was even bigger. Both were triumphant Soviet victories, but they also could have been devastating defeats that would have shifted the balance once again. As Loosey said: German defeat probably was inevitable, but by no means easy.
The Soviets were starting to win the war in part because they could develop their strategies based on the reliability of Allied supplies. What is interesting here is that we have two opposing statements: Loosey said that the Pacific route to Vladivostok was the more important one, Foro says the same thing for the Persian Corridor. I'd be interested in seeing both of your sources for that. Moreover, just because the Pacific route was interrupted twice does not mean that the total of shipped goods on that route was not bigger than those via the Persian Corridor.
Defeating Germany wasn't just about winning a battle, or winning a series of battles, either. Defeating Germany was a massive co-operative effort. It was, in fact, the greatest international co-operation project ever undertaken. The entire economies of the USA, Canada, UK, and USSR were turned to the focus. Yes, this economic might is much larger than Germany's, and the combined Axis might, but consider that the economies of the USA, Canada, and UK were not in war mode in 1939; consider the USSR did not switch over to a full economy until 1942.
In 1939, Germany had been building for the war for 4 years. They had the best airplane (Bf-109), best bomber (Ju-87). They had an extremely good series of tanks (PzKpfw 38t, PzKpfw III). They had an organizational advantage and the best mechanized mind in the world in Guderian, who constructed the Panzer corps to a very high standard. They had the best submarine the world had ever seen (Type VII) and they were constructing two super-battleships that could theoretically make any two other ships in the world say uncle. Germany had subsumed the war machinery of Czechoslovakia, including the Skoda tank works - which were generally considered the best in the world. The 38t that was the primary vehicle used in Poland, the Low Countries, and France was built there, and the Germans stole it wholesale. 38t was one of the better tanks at that time, and the Germans used it to great effect.
The UK very quickly switched to a war footing, but the UK depended on France to hold. They did not have the arms or armaments. The defeat at Dunkirk deprived the entire British Army of its materiel. Trucks. Guns. Artillery. Tanks. All gone. It took the UK an entire year to recover from that. That was a HUGE economic victory. The massive factories of France were denied to the UK - and remember the UK had to devote a lot of its manufacturing to creating the Royal Navy and augmenting the Royal Canadian Navy for escort duty. Germany could force much more economic diversion with a small sliver - the U-Boat menace. Consider that the UK had the Spitfire, which was a world-beater, since 1938 but only had a few hundred in the air during the Battle of Britain, and struggled to keep up with casualties during the critical portion in August/September. The British manufacturing ability was stretched thin. Canada was super-Depressed and unable to assist. Lend-Lease did not pass until March of 1941. Germany won the economic war in the first 2 years easily, even with major losses like the destruction of the Bismarck.
So if the USSR had the greater economic potential, how come it was even a toss up? I mean, on paper, the USSR should have crushed Germany from the first go, right? Except the Germans had a huge qualitative advantage. Massive. Not just in arms, but in training, and certainly in generalship. Operation Barbarossa not only destroyed the entire Soviet Air Force (VVS), but also took out 20,500 Soviet tanks. Over 20,000. The German blitzkrieg conquered literally 90% of the Soviet industrialized area. The Soviets were smart and moved their factories east of the Urals (where many still remain) but this was a huge interruption in their production ability. They focused on tanks, planes, guns and ammo. The USSR did not bother making things they could easily get made in the USA. Like boots and trucks. That's how they were able to out-produce Germany. Germany had to make everything. The USSR was able to purposefully restructure their economy to focus on tanks, guns, planes, and ammo. Everything made that. Food? Shipped in. Clothes? Shipped in. If the USSR had to build their own trucks, that's tens of thousands of T-34s that they never would have fielded. Hundreds, thousands of artillery pieces. Millions of rifles.
The USA was the real economic power, but they were hampered by 3 factors. The first was a two-front war where public opinion was demanding a strike at Japan. The USA's ship-building efforts were placed into Japan very very heavily. The Royal Navy and Royal Canadian Navy had to handle the Atlantic. Two, the US merchant marine had to be expanded, which is where Liberty Ships came into play. Three, the USA had to supply each other Allied country with the things they needed to stick in the fight. Ammo, ships, and planes for the UK. Eventually tanks. Trucks for Russia. Everything that could be sent to China. Then they got to supply themselves.
Did the Germans make mistakes? Absolutely, but don't blame their generalship. Blame Hitler, who sacked generals he had no business sacking and promoted lackeys and idiots to their place. Rommel was a better general than Patton and Montgomery; Manstein was better than Zhukov and Konev; Kesselring better than both Clark and Alexander. Whenever Rommel met the British on equal footing, he won. Each and every single time. Montgomery almost always had a supply, quantitative, and qualitative advantage, but consider the Battle of Kasserine Pass, where the British (admittedly not under Monty) and Americans were thoroughly, completely crushed by Rommel. Consider Normandy, where Rommel had presented plans to Hitler to position 3 Panzer divisions on the Normandy beaches, a plan Hitler rejected. Those tanks could have thrown a good portion of the D-Day force back into the sea. Rommel was the better, smarter, more powerful general.
Consider the Manstein counterattack. This was AFTER Stalingrad. Manstein allowed the Soviets under Zhukov to overextend and then destroyed 52 divisions and tossed the USSR back past Kharkov. The counterattack is still studied in military academies today, including the Royal Military College of Canada and West Point. It was clinical and effective, and Manstein (as well as Guderian) insisted to Hitler that a dynamic strategy be employed on the east, using similar counterthrusts. Hitler denied this, fired Manstein, and ordered the disastrous attack at Kursk. Consider Kesselring's static defenses in Italy and their success, as well as his dynamic defense of Anzio. He was understaffed and underequipped, and he held off the Allies for years. These were more able men. The Allies had superior economic might...eventually.
All of these things are not huge events, but the great battles of WW2 were not very decisive. They were indicative of the way the tide was going. What if the USA lost Midway (since that was a battle Foro stated as decisive). Then they would have lost 3 carriers and Midway Island. Know what that would have meant in the long run? Jack fucking shit. The USA already had 7 Essex-class carriers being built, 9 Independence-class light carriers. They had Saratoga, Ranger, and Wasp that could be brought to Hawaii to defend it. It would have prolonged the war a few months. Then the USA would put this amazing naval fleet together, toss on the F6F Hellcat and F4U Corsairs and destroyed the Combined Fleet a few months after it actually happened.
What would have happened if Stalingrad fell? Probably not much different. The Battle of Stalingrad exhausted the German army's ability to fight. The Germans had over-reached, and victory or defeat, were not going to knock the USSR out of the war. That they lost the 6th Army was a blow, but not a decisive one. Not really. It wasn't even the turning point. WW2's real turning point was Dec. 7th, 1941. The day the USA entered the war. The day the Germans fell back from Moscow. After that, it was really just a matter of time. The USSR alone? I honestly don't know that they could win.
One final thought: On July 22, 1941, when Operation Barbarossa started, the Germans & their allies had 5 divisions in Norway (to defend the coast, not pretending to be in Norway but actually in Finland), 70 divisions in the Balkans, 10 divisions in Africa, and 41 divisions in France and the Low Countries. 116 divisions all told that the Germans were using to defend against the British or hold down the people they'd already conquered - and mostly the former. Over a third of the Axis forces tied down. Imagine if *that* had been pointed at the USSR!
In 1939, Germany had been building for the war for 4 years. They had the best airplane (Bf-109), best bomber (Ju-87). They had an extremely good series of tanks (PzKpfw 38t, PzKpfw III). They had an organizational advantage and the best mechanized mind in the world in Guderian, who constructed the Panzer corps to a very high standard. They had the best submarine the world had ever seen (Type VII) and they were constructing two super-battleships that could theoretically make any two other ships in the world say uncle. Germany had subsumed the war machinery of Czechoslovakia, including the Skoda tank works - which were generally considered the best in the world. The 38t that was the primary vehicle used in Poland, the Low Countries, and France was built there, and the Germans stole it wholesale. 38t was one of the better tanks at that time, and the Germans used it to great effect.
The UK very quickly switched to a war footing, but the UK depended on France to hold. They did not have the arms or armaments. The defeat at Dunkirk deprived the entire British Army of its materiel. Trucks. Guns. Artillery. Tanks. All gone. It took the UK an entire year to recover from that. That was a HUGE economic victory. The massive factories of France were denied to the UK - and remember the UK had to devote a lot of its manufacturing to creating the Royal Navy and augmenting the Royal Canadian Navy for escort duty. Germany could force much more economic diversion with a small sliver - the U-Boat menace. Consider that the UK had the Spitfire, which was a world-beater, since 1938 but only had a few hundred in the air during the Battle of Britain, and struggled to keep up with casualties during the critical portion in August/September. The British manufacturing ability was stretched thin. Canada was super-Depressed and unable to assist. Lend-Lease did not pass until March of 1941. Germany won the economic war in the first 2 years easily, even with major losses like the destruction of the Bismarck.
So if the USSR had the greater economic potential, how come it was even a toss up? I mean, on paper, the USSR should have crushed Germany from the first go, right? Except the Germans had a huge qualitative advantage. Massive. Not just in arms, but in training, and certainly in generalship. Operation Barbarossa not only destroyed the entire Soviet Air Force (VVS), but also took out 20,500 Soviet tanks. Over 20,000. The German blitzkrieg conquered literally 90% of the Soviet industrialized area. The Soviets were smart and moved their factories east of the Urals (where many still remain) but this was a huge interruption in their production ability. They focused on tanks, planes, guns and ammo. The USSR did not bother making things they could easily get made in the USA. Like boots and trucks. That's how they were able to out-produce Germany. Germany had to make everything. The USSR was able to purposefully restructure their economy to focus on tanks, guns, planes, and ammo. Everything made that. Food? Shipped in. Clothes? Shipped in. If the USSR had to build their own trucks, that's tens of thousands of T-34s that they never would have fielded. Hundreds, thousands of artillery pieces. Millions of rifles.
The USA was the real economic power, but they were hampered by 3 factors. The first was a two-front war where public opinion was demanding a strike at Japan. The USA's ship-building efforts were placed into Japan very very heavily. The Royal Navy and Royal Canadian Navy had to handle the Atlantic. Two, the US merchant marine had to be expanded, which is where Liberty Ships came into play. Three, the USA had to supply each other Allied country with the things they needed to stick in the fight. Ammo, ships, and planes for the UK. Eventually tanks. Trucks for Russia. Everything that could be sent to China. Then they got to supply themselves.
Did the Germans make mistakes? Absolutely, but don't blame their generalship. Blame Hitler, who sacked generals he had no business sacking and promoted lackeys and idiots to their place. Rommel was a better general than Patton and Montgomery; Manstein was better than Zhukov and Konev; Kesselring better than both Clark and Alexander. Whenever Rommel met the British on equal footing, he won. Each and every single time. Montgomery almost always had a supply, quantitative, and qualitative advantage, but consider the Battle of Kasserine Pass, where the British (admittedly not under Monty) and Americans were thoroughly, completely crushed by Rommel. Consider Normandy, where Rommel had presented plans to Hitler to position 3 Panzer divisions on the Normandy beaches, a plan Hitler rejected. Those tanks could have thrown a good portion of the D-Day force back into the sea. Rommel was the better, smarter, more powerful general.
Consider the Manstein counterattack. This was AFTER Stalingrad. Manstein allowed the Soviets under Zhukov to overextend and then destroyed 52 divisions and tossed the USSR back past Kharkov. The counterattack is still studied in military academies today, including the Royal Military College of Canada and West Point. It was clinical and effective, and Manstein (as well as Guderian) insisted to Hitler that a dynamic strategy be employed on the east, using similar counterthrusts. Hitler denied this, fired Manstein, and ordered the disastrous attack at Kursk. Consider Kesselring's static defenses in Italy and their success, as well as his dynamic defense of Anzio. He was understaffed and underequipped, and he held off the Allies for years. These were more able men. The Allies had superior economic might...eventually.
All of these things are not huge events, but the great battles of WW2 were not very decisive. They were indicative of the way the tide was going. What if the USA lost Midway (since that was a battle Foro stated as decisive). Then they would have lost 3 carriers and Midway Island. Know what that would have meant in the long run? Jack fucking shit. The USA already had 7 Essex-class carriers being built, 9 Independence-class light carriers. They had Saratoga, Ranger, and Wasp that could be brought to Hawaii to defend it. It would have prolonged the war a few months. Then the USA would put this amazing naval fleet together, toss on the F6F Hellcat and F4U Corsairs and destroyed the Combined Fleet a few months after it actually happened.
What would have happened if Stalingrad fell? Probably not much different. The Battle of Stalingrad exhausted the German army's ability to fight. The Germans had over-reached, and victory or defeat, were not going to knock the USSR out of the war. That they lost the 6th Army was a blow, but not a decisive one. Not really. It wasn't even the turning point. WW2's real turning point was Dec. 7th, 1941. The day the USA entered the war. The day the Germans fell back from Moscow. After that, it was really just a matter of time. The USSR alone? I honestly don't know that they could win.
One final thought: On July 22, 1941, when Operation Barbarossa started, the Germans & their allies had 5 divisions in Norway (to defend the coast, not pretending to be in Norway but actually in Finland), 70 divisions in the Balkans, 10 divisions in Africa, and 41 divisions in France and the Low Countries. 116 divisions all told that the Germans were using to defend against the British or hold down the people they'd already conquered - and mostly the former. Over a third of the Axis forces tied down. Imagine if *that* had been pointed at the USSR!
Forostar
Ancient Mariner
Wow, lengthy posts. Right now, I really miss the time when I had more time to spend on lengthy discussions as interesting as this one. :/ My three year old son is taking lots of my attention, so bear with me, I can't address everything you guys are saying. I can only start with Per now.
First I want to stress that I absolutely do not think anything was easy in WWII. It's all very complex and lots of it tied to one another. I acknowledge that the trucks the Russians got meant a lot. It sure must have sped up things.
I have never said it was easy. I am the last to say it. But I feel we differ in saying how important the Soviet-German battles were.
Stalingrad was not the decisive event of the Second World War. It was far from being the largest battle on the Eastern Front. Yet, in psychological terms it was immensely significant. It sent shivers through Berlin, all enemies of Hitler were glad. One cannot exaggerate its impact on the minds of the Britons and Americans who at the time had no single soldier fighting on European soil. The 6th Army was eliminated, the Germans were forced to retreat. Army Group B raced back to the Caucasus to avoid being cut off. Germany's second offensive on the Eastern Front failed with shame and disgrace. And there was no end in sight.
In the wake of that battle, the Red Army pressed steadily forward, constantly probing German lines with hundreds of local attacks, denying the Germans time for effective recovery (a technique, ideally suited to the superiority of the Red Army's men and guns).
LC: the battle of Kursk. The significance of that battle cannot be overrated. It was the decisive battle. The Wehrmacht's prime strike force was destroyed so completely that a major offense could never be launched again. On the day Zhukov unleashed his counter-attack at Kursk, the Western Powers had not landed a single soldier on the European mainland. And from Kursk Zhukov was heading relentlessly for the Führerbunker in Berlin.
Kursk was not won by pure luck. A plan was devised by Zhukov and Stalin. It foresaw a scenario in which a massed panzer attack -indeed a double mass panzer assault- would be stopped in its tracks for the first time in the war. Already in April it was calculated that if sufficient defenses could be put up in place, the Red Army possessed more than sufficient reserves (especially tanks) to deliver a devastating counter attack of its own.
I didn't mean that the Pacific route was interrupted twice. I talked about the Arctic convoys. So there are three routes, which all contributed. Arctic Convoys, the Persian Corridor, and the Pacific Route.
From wiki: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Persian_Corridor
the Allied supply efforts were enormous. The Americans alone delivered over 16,3 million tonnes to the Soviets during the war, via three routes, including Arctic convoys of World War II to the ports of Murmansk and Archangelsk. Also, Soviet shipping carried supplies from the west coast of the United States and Canada to Vladivostok in the Far East, since the Soviet Union was not at war with Japan at that time (not until August 1945). The Persian Corridor was the route for 4,159,117 long tons (4,225,858 metric tonnes) of this cargo. However, this was not the only American contribution via the Persian Corridor - not to mention the contributions of other Allies like Great Britain, Canada, South Africa, Australia, and numerous other nations, colonies, and protectorates of the Allied nations. All told, about 7,900,000 long tons (8,000,000 metric tonnes) of shipborne cargo from Allied sources were unloaded in the Corridor, most of it bound for Russia - but some of it for British forces under the Middle East Command, or for the Iranian economy, which was sustaining the influx of tens of thousands of foreign troops and Polish refugees. Also, supplies were needed for the development of new transportation and logistics facilities in Persia and in the Soviet Union. The tonnage figure does not include transfers of warplanes via Persia.
LC, lots of interesting things you say, I am looking forward to plunge into that later.
First I want to stress that I absolutely do not think anything was easy in WWII. It's all very complex and lots of it tied to one another. I acknowledge that the trucks the Russians got meant a lot. It sure must have sped up things.
I have never said it was easy. I am the last to say it. But I feel we differ in saying how important the Soviet-German battles were.
Stalingrad was not the decisive event of the Second World War. It was far from being the largest battle on the Eastern Front. Yet, in psychological terms it was immensely significant. It sent shivers through Berlin, all enemies of Hitler were glad. One cannot exaggerate its impact on the minds of the Britons and Americans who at the time had no single soldier fighting on European soil. The 6th Army was eliminated, the Germans were forced to retreat. Army Group B raced back to the Caucasus to avoid being cut off. Germany's second offensive on the Eastern Front failed with shame and disgrace. And there was no end in sight.
In the wake of that battle, the Red Army pressed steadily forward, constantly probing German lines with hundreds of local attacks, denying the Germans time for effective recovery (a technique, ideally suited to the superiority of the Red Army's men and guns).
LC: the battle of Kursk. The significance of that battle cannot be overrated. It was the decisive battle. The Wehrmacht's prime strike force was destroyed so completely that a major offense could never be launched again. On the day Zhukov unleashed his counter-attack at Kursk, the Western Powers had not landed a single soldier on the European mainland. And from Kursk Zhukov was heading relentlessly for the Führerbunker in Berlin.
Kursk was not won by pure luck. A plan was devised by Zhukov and Stalin. It foresaw a scenario in which a massed panzer attack -indeed a double mass panzer assault- would be stopped in its tracks for the first time in the war. Already in April it was calculated that if sufficient defenses could be put up in place, the Red Army possessed more than sufficient reserves (especially tanks) to deliver a devastating counter attack of its own.
I didn't mean that the Pacific route was interrupted twice. I talked about the Arctic convoys. So there are three routes, which all contributed. Arctic Convoys, the Persian Corridor, and the Pacific Route.
From wiki: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Persian_Corridor
the Allied supply efforts were enormous. The Americans alone delivered over 16,3 million tonnes to the Soviets during the war, via three routes, including Arctic convoys of World War II to the ports of Murmansk and Archangelsk. Also, Soviet shipping carried supplies from the west coast of the United States and Canada to Vladivostok in the Far East, since the Soviet Union was not at war with Japan at that time (not until August 1945). The Persian Corridor was the route for 4,159,117 long tons (4,225,858 metric tonnes) of this cargo. However, this was not the only American contribution via the Persian Corridor - not to mention the contributions of other Allies like Great Britain, Canada, South Africa, Australia, and numerous other nations, colonies, and protectorates of the Allied nations. All told, about 7,900,000 long tons (8,000,000 metric tonnes) of shipborne cargo from Allied sources were unloaded in the Corridor, most of it bound for Russia - but some of it for British forces under the Middle East Command, or for the Iranian economy, which was sustaining the influx of tens of thousands of foreign troops and Polish refugees. Also, supplies were needed for the development of new transportation and logistics facilities in Persia and in the Soviet Union. The tonnage figure does not include transfers of warplanes via Persia.
LC, lots of interesting things you say, I am looking forward to plunge into that later.
Crimson Idol
Caveman
Just to throw in randomly.. thank you all for this to read. I enjoy lengthy detailed discussions but sadly don't know too much on the subject so this is a very good read - and I dare say a lot easier to digest than a book would be due to the format it is presented 
Forostar
Ancient Mariner
I suppose this part looks like the best to react at:
I don't know either. But once again I'd like to stress the significance of their input, compared to others. The key factor why the Western input was significantly smaller than generally supposed centers on timing, and in particular on the lateness of American engagement. American involvement took time to organize. It did not begin until January 1942 and could not peak efficiency instantaneously. The American build-up was far from complete by the time that the war in Europe ended. The timescale was crucial. Despite enormous progress, the USA did not possess either an atomic weapon or superiority in conventional arms. It had not yet moved into the nuclear league, and it possessed barely a hundred battle-ready divisions, compared with German and Soviet troop levels that were two or three times higher. As Marshall and Eisenhower were only too well aware, they could not possibly have risked a serious confrontation with the Red Army. Indeed, with the Japanese war still moving slowly, they desperately needed Soviet assistance both in Europe and in the Far East.
Speaking of dependency....
The following is not about you LC, or Perun, but I'd like to state that lots of people forget, or are influenced by later developments. They tend to imagine that the USA was all-powerful from the start. And they are easily led to believe that the failure to challenge Stalin earlier or more energetically must be put down to purely personal or political factors. Such was not the case.
American forces had not gained parity with the USSR in May 1945; and that's why their actions were constrained. As things were, it was the Soviet Union, not the USA, which fought the final phase of the war as the strongest power in Europe. It was the Red Army which scored the most crushing victories over Nazi Germany, culminating in the Battle for Berlin. And it was Soviet Communism, not liberal democracy, that made the most striking advances.
I don't know either. But once again I'd like to stress the significance of their input, compared to others. The key factor why the Western input was significantly smaller than generally supposed centers on timing, and in particular on the lateness of American engagement. American involvement took time to organize. It did not begin until January 1942 and could not peak efficiency instantaneously. The American build-up was far from complete by the time that the war in Europe ended. The timescale was crucial. Despite enormous progress, the USA did not possess either an atomic weapon or superiority in conventional arms. It had not yet moved into the nuclear league, and it possessed barely a hundred battle-ready divisions, compared with German and Soviet troop levels that were two or three times higher. As Marshall and Eisenhower were only too well aware, they could not possibly have risked a serious confrontation with the Red Army. Indeed, with the Japanese war still moving slowly, they desperately needed Soviet assistance both in Europe and in the Far East.
Speaking of dependency....
The following is not about you LC, or Perun, but I'd like to state that lots of people forget, or are influenced by later developments. They tend to imagine that the USA was all-powerful from the start. And they are easily led to believe that the failure to challenge Stalin earlier or more energetically must be put down to purely personal or political factors. Such was not the case.
American forces had not gained parity with the USSR in May 1945; and that's why their actions were constrained. As things were, it was the Soviet Union, not the USA, which fought the final phase of the war as the strongest power in Europe. It was the Red Army which scored the most crushing victories over Nazi Germany, culminating in the Battle for Berlin. And it was Soviet Communism, not liberal democracy, that made the most striking advances.
There is absolutely no doubt that the Western Allies were not the equal of the USSR at the end of the war. I think that both Perun and I, as professional history scholars, are well aware of the amount of time it took the US to ramp up war production. We both also can read the numbers. The Red Army was massive, and it was well-equipped. The Western Allies had parity in the air, perhaps, and certainly had the advantage at sea (an advantage almost meaningless against Russia).
There is no doubt that the USSR did the majority of the fighting, suffered the majority of the casualties, and above all, destroyed the most German war-making capacity compared to any other country, by far. Even after D-Day, 70% of the Wehrmacht was in the East, fighting the Soviets. The point I'm trying to make is that the USSR was really, really, REALLY close to defeat in 1941, and their need to keep forces back against the British significantly hampered their war-making ability in Russia.
I don't think the USSR could have defeated the Western Allies in the post-WW2 era, but they could have tossed us off the European continent. But Stalin did not want to fight the USA, because he knew that a) the USA would have nuclear bombs very soon, and b) the USA had the ability to eventually field an army capable of defeating the USSR. Especially if the USSR had to retool their industries (which they did in the 1940s and 50s to make up for the lack of Lend-Lease).
If there was no Western Front, I am only sure that the USSR would have been worse hurt by Operation Barbarossa. If there was no Lend-Lease, there would have been no Operation Bagration that destroyed Army Group Centre in Poland, not until at least 1945 or even 1946. Most scholars of the Soviet war effort agree that Lend-Lease was the #1 reason the USSR was able to build a mechanized, mobile army the size needed to destroy the Wehrmacht. Otherwise it would have had a powerful tank fleet that was very constrained to fixed supply points, which, if you look at Operation Bagration, would not have helped them. The German ability to move supply depots in the East was originally much greater than the Soviet, until post-Kursk.
Interestingly enough, I agree that Kursk was the critical point where the German army was damaged beyond repair. But I think they had already lost the war, and it was just a matter of time, at that point. Had they done something other than Kursk, the Soviets may have been thrown back again.
There is no doubt that the USSR did the majority of the fighting, suffered the majority of the casualties, and above all, destroyed the most German war-making capacity compared to any other country, by far. Even after D-Day, 70% of the Wehrmacht was in the East, fighting the Soviets. The point I'm trying to make is that the USSR was really, really, REALLY close to defeat in 1941, and their need to keep forces back against the British significantly hampered their war-making ability in Russia.
I don't think the USSR could have defeated the Western Allies in the post-WW2 era, but they could have tossed us off the European continent. But Stalin did not want to fight the USA, because he knew that a) the USA would have nuclear bombs very soon, and b) the USA had the ability to eventually field an army capable of defeating the USSR. Especially if the USSR had to retool their industries (which they did in the 1940s and 50s to make up for the lack of Lend-Lease).
If there was no Western Front, I am only sure that the USSR would have been worse hurt by Operation Barbarossa. If there was no Lend-Lease, there would have been no Operation Bagration that destroyed Army Group Centre in Poland, not until at least 1945 or even 1946. Most scholars of the Soviet war effort agree that Lend-Lease was the #1 reason the USSR was able to build a mechanized, mobile army the size needed to destroy the Wehrmacht. Otherwise it would have had a powerful tank fleet that was very constrained to fixed supply points, which, if you look at Operation Bagration, would not have helped them. The German ability to move supply depots in the East was originally much greater than the Soviet, until post-Kursk.
Interestingly enough, I agree that Kursk was the critical point where the German army was damaged beyond repair. But I think they had already lost the war, and it was just a matter of time, at that point. Had they done something other than Kursk, the Soviets may have been thrown back again.