Black Wizard
Pleb Hunter
The Iranian government is doing this?
USA Politics
- Thread starter Genghis Khan
- Start date
If it was not a treaty by those definitions, it wasn't because the Republicans didn't allow it to be. Holding that against it is the mother of circular reasoning. Everyone outside the US calls it a treaty. And the US aren't the only ones involved - France, the UK and Germany were also parties in the negotiations. The orange lunatic in the White House and his lackeys may forget that, but we in these countries don't. The US isn't the only country in the world.
A bad "deal" in this case is still better than no "deal" at all. Iran complied to strict regulations. Maybe they didn't go far enough, but now they have no reason to comply with any regulations at all.
Black Wizard
Pleb Hunter
AlexS
Nomad
Through its various proxies, yes. http://jcpa.org/killing-americans-allies-irans-war/ Not to mention its past record since the '83 Beirut bombing, and its proxy Shiite militias in Iraq.
AlexS
Nomad
Perhaps those other countries signed and ratified it in a way that makes it a binding treaty upon them. But the U.S. did not; under our Constitution a treaty requires ratification by the Senate in order to be binding on the U.S. Obama failed to seek ratification, therefore he did not have authority to bind future administrations to whatever agreement he made. This was not a secret.
EDIT: I also just learned that the EU countries that are squawking most loudly about the US exiting the deal have been making billions on trade with Iran since the deal was made. So there are some major economic incentives for them to keep the agreement in place.
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I feel the need to point out that the article you selected is an editorial. Its primary assertion that "According to the administration, today Iran needs a year to use the nuclear materials it is known to possess to make a nuclear bomb. Other sources claim that Iran requires several months to accomplish the task.
Since these materials will remain in Iran’s possession under the deal, if Iran abandons the agreement, it will need at most a year to build nuclear weapons."
This was untrue in 2015 (when the article was written) and remains untrue now. Iran gave up 98% of its enriched uranium and filled in its plutonium-producing reactor, significantly decaying its ability to produce a nuclear weapon. What enrichment it is to be allowed is to be sufficient for nuclear reactor fuel, and not for nuclear weapons. What this article doesn't say was that at the time of writing, US intelligence believed Iran was capable of producing enough fuel (not producing a nuke, enough fuel for ONE) within 2-3 months; this will delay that time to a year after resuming production - and there's nothing stopping the P5+1 powers from instituting new sanctions should they move in that direction at the end of the agreement, or using that extra space to consider additional actions.
I don't think anyone in the world thought this was a permanent solution, but a means by which to slow down Iranian production by several years with the hope that after the expiration of the period of time, there would either be an extension of the agreement or a different government in Tehran.
Furthermore, massive sanctions on Iran remain in place due to their sponsoring of terrorism, amongst other reasons.
I have yet to see one single argument that suggests this was anything other than a good deal that Iran was complying with on almost every front, and I suspect that the reason Trump withdrew is because a) he believes his brand of diplomacy will solve the problem in a better way, and b) he wants to undo Obama because "Obama bad".
Forostar
Ancient Mariner
Forostar
Ancient Mariner
I know some people intensely dislike Obama and most of what he did (not), but if they could focus on the meaning of these words, that would help:
Barack Obama, 8 May:
There are few issues more important to the security of the United States than the potential spread of nuclear weapons, or the potential for even more destructive war in the Middle East. That’s why the United States negotiated the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in the first place.
The reality is clear. The JCPOA is working – that is a view shared by our European allies, independent experts, and the current U.S. Secretary of Defense. The JCPOA is in America’s interest – it has significantly rolled back Iran’s nuclear program. And the JCPOA is a model for what diplomacy can accomplish – its inspections and verification regime is precisely what the United States should be working to put in place with North Korea. Indeed, at a time when we are all rooting for diplomacy with North Korea to succeed, walking away from the JCPOA risks losing a deal that accomplishes – with Iran – the very outcome that we are pursuing with the North Koreans.
That is why today’s announcement is so misguided. Walking away from the JCPOA turns our back on America’s closest allies, and an agreement that our country’s leading diplomats, scientists, and intelligence professionals negotiated. In a democracy, there will always be changes in policies and priorities from one Administration to the next. But the consistent flouting of agreements that our country is a party to risks eroding America’s credibility, and puts us at odds with the world’s major powers.
Debates in our country should be informed by facts, especially debates that have proven to be divisive. So it’s important to review several facts about the JCPOA.
First, the JCPOA was not just an agreement between my Administration and the Iranian government. After years of building an international coalition that could impose crippling sanctions on Iran, we reached the JCPOA together with the United Kingdom, France, Germany, the European Union, Russia, China, and Iran. It is a multilateral arms control deal, unanimously endorsed by a United Nations Security Council Resolution.
Second, the JCPOA has worked in rolling back Iran’s nuclear program. For decades, Iran had steadily advanced its nuclear program, approaching the point where they could rapidly produce enough fissile material to build a bomb. The JCPOA put a lid on that breakout capacity. Since the JCPOA was implemented, Iran has destroyed the core of a reactor that could have produced weapons-grade plutonium; removed two-thirds of its centrifuges (over 13,000) and placed them under international monitoring; and eliminated 97 percent of its stockpile of enriched uranium – the raw materials necessary for a bomb. So by any measure, the JCPOA has imposed strict limitations on Iran's nuclear program and achieved real results.
Third, the JCPOA does not rely on trust – it is rooted in the most far-reaching inspections and verification regime ever negotiated in an arms control deal. Iran’s nuclear facilities are strictly monitored. International monitors also have access to Iran’s entire nuclear supply chain, so that we can catch them if they cheat. Without the JCPOA, this monitoring and inspections regime would go away.
Fourth, Iran is complying with the JCPOA. That was not simply the view of my Administration. The United States intelligence community has continued to find that Iran is meeting its responsibilities under the deal, and has reported as much to Congress. So have our closest allies, and the international agency responsible for verifying Iranian compliance – the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
Fifth, the JCPOA does not expire. The prohibition on Iran ever obtaining a nuclear weapon is permanent. Some of the most important and intrusive inspections codified by the JCPOA are permanent. Even as some of the provisions in the JCPOA do become less strict with time, this won’t happen until ten, fifteen, twenty, or twenty-five years into the deal, so there is little reason to put those restrictions at risk today.
Finally, the JCPOA was never intended to solve all of our problems with Iran. We were clear-eyed that Iran engages in destabilizing behavior – including support for terrorism, and threats toward Israel and its neighbors. But that’s precisely why it was so important that we prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. Every aspect of Iranian behavior that is troubling is far more dangerous if their nuclear program is unconstrained. Our ability to confront Iran’s destabilizing behavior – and to sustain a unity of purpose with our allies – is strengthened with the JCPOA, and weakened without it.
Because of these facts, I believe that the decision to put the JCPOA at risk without any Iranian violation of the deal is a serious mistake. Without the JCPOA, the United States could eventually be left with a losing choice between a nuclear-armed Iran or another war in the Middle East. We all know the dangers of Iran obtaining a nuclear weapon. It could embolden an already dangerous regime; threaten our friends with destruction; pose unacceptable dangers to America’s own security; and trigger an arms race in the world’s most dangerous region. If the constraints on Iran’s nuclear program under the JCPOA are lost, we could be hastening the day when we are faced with the choice between living with that threat, or going to war to prevent it.
In a dangerous world, America must be able to rely in part on strong, principled diplomacy to secure our country. We have been safer in the years since we achieved the JCPOA, thanks in part to the work of our diplomats, many members of Congress, and our allies. Going forward, I hope that Americans continue to speak out in support of the kind of strong, principled, fact-based, and unifying leadership that can best secure our country and uphold our responsibilities around the globe.
Barack Obama, 8 May:
There are few issues more important to the security of the United States than the potential spread of nuclear weapons, or the potential for even more destructive war in the Middle East. That’s why the United States negotiated the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in the first place.
The reality is clear. The JCPOA is working – that is a view shared by our European allies, independent experts, and the current U.S. Secretary of Defense. The JCPOA is in America’s interest – it has significantly rolled back Iran’s nuclear program. And the JCPOA is a model for what diplomacy can accomplish – its inspections and verification regime is precisely what the United States should be working to put in place with North Korea. Indeed, at a time when we are all rooting for diplomacy with North Korea to succeed, walking away from the JCPOA risks losing a deal that accomplishes – with Iran – the very outcome that we are pursuing with the North Koreans.
That is why today’s announcement is so misguided. Walking away from the JCPOA turns our back on America’s closest allies, and an agreement that our country’s leading diplomats, scientists, and intelligence professionals negotiated. In a democracy, there will always be changes in policies and priorities from one Administration to the next. But the consistent flouting of agreements that our country is a party to risks eroding America’s credibility, and puts us at odds with the world’s major powers.
Debates in our country should be informed by facts, especially debates that have proven to be divisive. So it’s important to review several facts about the JCPOA.
First, the JCPOA was not just an agreement between my Administration and the Iranian government. After years of building an international coalition that could impose crippling sanctions on Iran, we reached the JCPOA together with the United Kingdom, France, Germany, the European Union, Russia, China, and Iran. It is a multilateral arms control deal, unanimously endorsed by a United Nations Security Council Resolution.
Second, the JCPOA has worked in rolling back Iran’s nuclear program. For decades, Iran had steadily advanced its nuclear program, approaching the point where they could rapidly produce enough fissile material to build a bomb. The JCPOA put a lid on that breakout capacity. Since the JCPOA was implemented, Iran has destroyed the core of a reactor that could have produced weapons-grade plutonium; removed two-thirds of its centrifuges (over 13,000) and placed them under international monitoring; and eliminated 97 percent of its stockpile of enriched uranium – the raw materials necessary for a bomb. So by any measure, the JCPOA has imposed strict limitations on Iran's nuclear program and achieved real results.
Third, the JCPOA does not rely on trust – it is rooted in the most far-reaching inspections and verification regime ever negotiated in an arms control deal. Iran’s nuclear facilities are strictly monitored. International monitors also have access to Iran’s entire nuclear supply chain, so that we can catch them if they cheat. Without the JCPOA, this monitoring and inspections regime would go away.
Fourth, Iran is complying with the JCPOA. That was not simply the view of my Administration. The United States intelligence community has continued to find that Iran is meeting its responsibilities under the deal, and has reported as much to Congress. So have our closest allies, and the international agency responsible for verifying Iranian compliance – the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
Fifth, the JCPOA does not expire. The prohibition on Iran ever obtaining a nuclear weapon is permanent. Some of the most important and intrusive inspections codified by the JCPOA are permanent. Even as some of the provisions in the JCPOA do become less strict with time, this won’t happen until ten, fifteen, twenty, or twenty-five years into the deal, so there is little reason to put those restrictions at risk today.
Finally, the JCPOA was never intended to solve all of our problems with Iran. We were clear-eyed that Iran engages in destabilizing behavior – including support for terrorism, and threats toward Israel and its neighbors. But that’s precisely why it was so important that we prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. Every aspect of Iranian behavior that is troubling is far more dangerous if their nuclear program is unconstrained. Our ability to confront Iran’s destabilizing behavior – and to sustain a unity of purpose with our allies – is strengthened with the JCPOA, and weakened without it.
Because of these facts, I believe that the decision to put the JCPOA at risk without any Iranian violation of the deal is a serious mistake. Without the JCPOA, the United States could eventually be left with a losing choice between a nuclear-armed Iran or another war in the Middle East. We all know the dangers of Iran obtaining a nuclear weapon. It could embolden an already dangerous regime; threaten our friends with destruction; pose unacceptable dangers to America’s own security; and trigger an arms race in the world’s most dangerous region. If the constraints on Iran’s nuclear program under the JCPOA are lost, we could be hastening the day when we are faced with the choice between living with that threat, or going to war to prevent it.
In a dangerous world, America must be able to rely in part on strong, principled diplomacy to secure our country. We have been safer in the years since we achieved the JCPOA, thanks in part to the work of our diplomats, many members of Congress, and our allies. Going forward, I hope that Americans continue to speak out in support of the kind of strong, principled, fact-based, and unifying leadership that can best secure our country and uphold our responsibilities around the globe.
Let's keep it civil, please.
D
Deleted member 7164
Guest
As always.
bearfan
Ancient Mariner
From CNN at the time
https://www.cnn.com/2015/03/12/politics/iran-nuclear-deal-treaty-obama-administration/index.html
-------------------------------- cut out a bunch of stuff ----------------------------
Secretary of State John Kerry stressed Wednesday that the administration never intended to negotiate a treaty.
"We've been clear from the beginning. We're not negotiating a 'legally binding plan.' We're negotiating a plan that will have in it a capacity for enforcement," he said at a Senate hearing.
Jim Walsh, a specialist on the Iran nuclear program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, said the Iran deal, which commits the United States to waive or lift sanctions, does not rise to the level of a formal treaty.
"Treaties traditionally have involved reductions in armaments, nuclear weapons, conventional forces. They require us to take something away that we have already built or established." In this case, the United States would lift sanctions, but would not be changing its military posture.
"We have had all sorts of agreement that were never ratified by Congress," Walsh said.
But David Rivkin, a constitutional and international law expert who worked for President George H.W. Bush, said that any international agreement requiring major undertakings on the part of the United States -- such as the proposed Iran deal -- must be sent to the Senate for advice and consent.
"The Constitution is quite clear," he said.
When Vice President Joe Biden was a senator in 2002, he wrote a letter to then-Secretary of State Colin Powell charging that a planned strategic arms reductions deal with Russia constituted a treaty subject to Senate approval since it would require "significant obligations by the United States."
Tim Kaine, a Democratic senator from Virginia who has signed onto a bill calling for the White House to put any deal up for a vote in Congress, said that Obama is within his rights to do what he is doing -- up to a point.
"It is not a treaty. If it were a treaty, there is a clear process. It would require a two-thirds vote in the Senate."
But Kaine told CNN on Wednesday that lawmakers did have a role to play at the point when sanctions mandated by Congress are bargained away to ensure Iran sticks to limits on its nuclear program.
"Congress has got to weigh in at some point," Kaine said.
https://www.cnn.com/2015/03/12/politics/iran-nuclear-deal-treaty-obama-administration/index.html
-------------------------------- cut out a bunch of stuff ----------------------------
Secretary of State John Kerry stressed Wednesday that the administration never intended to negotiate a treaty.
"We've been clear from the beginning. We're not negotiating a 'legally binding plan.' We're negotiating a plan that will have in it a capacity for enforcement," he said at a Senate hearing.
Jim Walsh, a specialist on the Iran nuclear program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, said the Iran deal, which commits the United States to waive or lift sanctions, does not rise to the level of a formal treaty.
"Treaties traditionally have involved reductions in armaments, nuclear weapons, conventional forces. They require us to take something away that we have already built or established." In this case, the United States would lift sanctions, but would not be changing its military posture.
"We have had all sorts of agreement that were never ratified by Congress," Walsh said.
But David Rivkin, a constitutional and international law expert who worked for President George H.W. Bush, said that any international agreement requiring major undertakings on the part of the United States -- such as the proposed Iran deal -- must be sent to the Senate for advice and consent.
"The Constitution is quite clear," he said.
When Vice President Joe Biden was a senator in 2002, he wrote a letter to then-Secretary of State Colin Powell charging that a planned strategic arms reductions deal with Russia constituted a treaty subject to Senate approval since it would require "significant obligations by the United States."
Tim Kaine, a Democratic senator from Virginia who has signed onto a bill calling for the White House to put any deal up for a vote in Congress, said that Obama is within his rights to do what he is doing -- up to a point.
"It is not a treaty. If it were a treaty, there is a clear process. It would require a two-thirds vote in the Senate."
But Kaine told CNN on Wednesday that lawmakers did have a role to play at the point when sanctions mandated by Congress are bargained away to ensure Iran sticks to limits on its nuclear program.
"Congress has got to weigh in at some point," Kaine said.
bearfan
Ancient Mariner
I had concerns with the deal to start with ... I thought it was lacking on the validation side, front loaded too many benefits to Iran (sanction reductions/eliminations) ahead of their actions.
That said, it was in place completely pulling out might not be the best move. But what it really comes down to, and I do not know the answer to this, is was Iran compliant in what they said they would do ... and if not .. by how much. I do not think we know that ... or maybe I just did not see it. What I have seen is a lot of speculation.
In some cases a bad deal can certainly be worse than no deal at all ... especially if it is the case where it was not really slowing down Iran's nuclear development in any meaningful way while at the same time giving them an economic infusion to prop up this regime and the non-state actors Iran props up.
But, that is offset by a deal being in place and there is something to be said for a continuity of policy from administration to administration.
Long story short .. I have mixed feelings on this. But think Trump had every right to pull out of it based on the deal itself and the deal not being a treaty ... and even if the general public wrongly thought it was a treaty, certainly Iran and every other government knew it was not.
That said, it was in place completely pulling out might not be the best move. But what it really comes down to, and I do not know the answer to this, is was Iran compliant in what they said they would do ... and if not .. by how much. I do not think we know that ... or maybe I just did not see it. What I have seen is a lot of speculation.
In some cases a bad deal can certainly be worse than no deal at all ... especially if it is the case where it was not really slowing down Iran's nuclear development in any meaningful way while at the same time giving them an economic infusion to prop up this regime and the non-state actors Iran props up.
But, that is offset by a deal being in place and there is something to be said for a continuity of policy from administration to administration.
Long story short .. I have mixed feelings on this. But think Trump had every right to pull out of it based on the deal itself and the deal not being a treaty ... and even if the general public wrongly thought it was a treaty, certainly Iran and every other government knew it was not.
Iran was forced to give 24/7 access to inspectors to their nuclear facilities, which they did by all accounts. We didn't have to take Iran's word that they are compliant, the control mechanisms are integral to the "deal"/treaty. The objective of the whole "deal"/treaty at least from the European perspective was to offer Iran an opportunity to return to the international community under the condition that it would play by international rules. This is something Iran agreed on under the condition that the other side would treat them as an equal partner.
Granted, the Iranian government is not a group of saints. Their involvement in Syria and Yemen has been problematic, to say the very least. This was a point that was deliberately left out of the negotiations and the "deal"/treaty. However, I think that had Iran been treated as an equal partner for a longer period of time, negotiations on this matter would have been possible.The thing is, how can we know if Tehran isn't responsive to diplomacy if this avenue hasn't even been explored properly? Think about it this way, the reason why Iran is buddies with Russia is because the West hasn't given them the opportunity to. It's a bit problematic to dwell on the things that happened in the revolution and its aftermath, because, well, this was 30+ years ago.
If, on the other hand, the objective of the US government is a regime change in Tehran, as John Bolton has said, then let's at least be honest about it. Don't tell Iran that re-negotiations are an option if they aren't. Trump should tell the world what his aim is, if only to let the rest of us have at least some sort of clue what's going on in his orange head.
The bottom line is, the pull-out is not just a problem for Iran, but also for the European nations. The "deal"/treaty was negotiated by them as well, they were all equal part of it. It's simply a huge "fuck you" to American allies who trusted in Washington. Many European companies are facing massive problems when they can no longer do business in Iran if they are being sanctioned by the US. Thing is: Europe and the US are supposed to be allies, and in an alliance between equal partners, one side simply doesn't do something that can harm the partner all on their own. This will have long lasting negative consequences for the European-American alliance. Even if Trump had the right to do it, it's poor diplomacy by a person who claims he's the world's best deal maker.
bearfan
Ancient Mariner
Pulling out of the deal and how it looks to our allies is by far the biggest negative to this. But the access point is not totally correct
http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-m...fact-sheet-6-things-know-about-iran-nuclear-/
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2. Some of Iran’s major nuclear facilities will be subject to constant monitoring, but if international inspectors suspect violations elsewhere, they may have to wait as long as 24 days.
Of course, just because Iran says it’ll agree to the restrictions doesn’t necessarily mean it will. To make sure Iran holds up its end of the bargain, the deal permits the atomic agency "to implement continuous monitoring." What that means and whether it’s enough are up for debate.
"Iran’s nuclear program will be under lock, key and camera 24 hours a day, 365 days a year," Rep. Don Beyer, D-Va., wrote in an op-ed supporting the deal.
That rates Half True. The agency will have cameras that provide 24-hour monitoring at the Natanz facility, which has 5,000 centrifuges, and inspectors will have daily access to the facility for 15 years. Within a year, there will be 130 to 150 inspectors in Iran.
But Natanz is more of the exception to the rule than the rule itself. For suspected sites where surveillance is not spelled out in the agreement, inspectors may have to wait up to 24 days for access. Some experts say that’s sufficient to detect violations, while others disagree.
http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-m...fact-sheet-6-things-know-about-iran-nuclear-/
-----------------------------------------------
2. Some of Iran’s major nuclear facilities will be subject to constant monitoring, but if international inspectors suspect violations elsewhere, they may have to wait as long as 24 days.
Of course, just because Iran says it’ll agree to the restrictions doesn’t necessarily mean it will. To make sure Iran holds up its end of the bargain, the deal permits the atomic agency "to implement continuous monitoring." What that means and whether it’s enough are up for debate.
"Iran’s nuclear program will be under lock, key and camera 24 hours a day, 365 days a year," Rep. Don Beyer, D-Va., wrote in an op-ed supporting the deal.
That rates Half True. The agency will have cameras that provide 24-hour monitoring at the Natanz facility, which has 5,000 centrifuges, and inspectors will have daily access to the facility for 15 years. Within a year, there will be 130 to 150 inspectors in Iran.
But Natanz is more of the exception to the rule than the rule itself. For suspected sites where surveillance is not spelled out in the agreement, inspectors may have to wait up to 24 days for access. Some experts say that’s sufficient to detect violations, while others disagree.
This is a half-truth itself. The 24 days rule applies to military facilities. All nuclear sites, like Natanz, Arak, Bushehr, Esfahan etc. are under 24/7 surveillance, and they have all been redesigned to make nuclear weapons development impossible.
The argument given is that even within 24 days, it would be impossible to remove any trace of a military nuclear program. In any case, any connection between nuclear and military facilities could not simply be covered up this easily; whether this is the case or not, the fact that international inspectors would be given access to a nation's military facilities is a major concession in itself. Just imagine an Iranian inspector asking for access to an American military base. It's a clear sign that Iran is not yet an equal partner in the "deal"/treaty, and they signed it nevertheless.