Oh, Canada :(

IronDuke

Ancient Mariner
Canada is officially broken. While thousands of Canadians wait hours for medical care, and while our universities struggle to stay afloat, and while our military is literally falling apart, the bosses of this one-party state have siphoned off hundreds of millions of dollars from the public treasury in order to enrich themselves. (see the story below)
I honestly thinkt here's something fundamentally wrong with this country. What happened to what Churchill called "the Great Dominion"? What happened to leaders who put Canada first and themselves second? Where are the Pearsons, the Lauriers, the Trudeaus? In other words, where have all the patriots gone?

Read and be disgusted:
(from the CBC)

There had been rumours and whispers about a fund that had been set up in the wake of the 1995 referendum on Quebec sovereignty to help promote federalism. The money was supposed to be used to raise Ottawa’s profile in Quebec.

The fund was run by the Public Works Department, headed at the time by Alfonso Gagliano, then Prime Minister Jean Chrétien’s Quebec lieutenant.

But it wasn’t clear how the money was handed out: there were no application forms for this fund that was supposed to help pay the costs of social and cultural events and programs. There were rumours that the money was little more than a vehicle to reward loyal Liberal supporters.

By the early spring of 2002, Chrétien was forced to address the issue. The Globe and Mail – under the Access to Information Act – tried to find out why the government paid $550,000 to Groupaction Marketing for a report that could not be found. No one at Public Works or the company could explain it.

Chrétien asked Auditor General Sheila Fraser to see what she could find out. She learned enough to launch a full investigation – and to ask the RCMP to get involved as well.

On Feb. 10, 2004, Fraser released her audit of the federal sponsorship program.

The scathing report used words such as "scandalous" and "appalling" to describe how the Liberal government abused the system.

She found that $100 million was paid to a variety of communications agencies in the form of fees and commissions and said the program was basically designed to generate commissions for these companies rather than to produce any benefit for Canadians.

Justice John Gomery watches as Prime Minister Paul Martin testifies before the inquiry, on Thursday, Feb 10, 2005. (CP Photo/Tom Hanson)
Officials in Canada's Public Works Department "broke just about every rule in the book" when it came to awarding contracts to Groupaction Inc., Fraser said.

Prime Minister Paul Martin ordered a public inquiry into how the sponsorship program was handled. He fired Gagliano, who had been appointed ambassador to Denmark. Five days later, Martin promised to resign if there was evidence that he knew about fraud in the program.

Two weeks after Fraser’s report was released, Martin suspended the heads of three Crown corporations: Michel Vennat, president of the Business Development Bank of Canada, Via Rail president Marc LeFrançois and Canada Post president André Ouellet. The report showed that five Crown corporations and agencies – the RCMP, VIA Rail, the Old Port of Montreal, the Business Development Bank of Canada and Canada Post – played a role in transferring money through questionable means.

All three men would eventually be fired.

The revelations from the unravelling scandal would cost the Liberals dearly in the election of June 28, 2004: their majority evaporated and – for the first time in 25 years – Canada had a minority government.

By September, Justice John Gomery would begin hearing testimony at the inquiry into the scandal.

On Feb. 8, 2005, former prime minister Jean Chrétien appeared before the Gomery inquiry. He vigorously defended the federal sponsorship program as an important part of the battle against Quebec sovereigntists in the wake of the 1995 referendum.

Mistakes were made, Chrétien conceded, and people who stole money should be punished.

Two days later, Prime Minister Martin – the man who called the inquiry – gave his testimony. He appeared a year to the day after he ordered the inquiry. It was the first time since Canada was six years old that a sitting prime minister testified before a public inquiry.

After Chrétien and Martin completed their testimony, the inquiry shifted to Montreal, where it would get to the "meatier" side of the story. Witnesses would include some of the people at the heart of sponsorship scandal.

Among them would be Jean Brault who ran Groupaction, an advertising company that was paid millions doing work for the government under the sponsorship program; Paul Coffin, who ran another advertising company that did well under the program; and Chuck Guité, who ran the program for the government.

But there would be complications – all three men faced criminal charges, accused of defrauding the government out of millions of dollars under the sponsorship program. Gomery would order a ban on the publication of their testimony because their appearances before the inquiry were scheduled for a few weeks before the beginning of their trials.

Coffin would later plead guilty to six counts of fraud. The trial of Guité and Brault would be delayed until the spring of 2006 and eventually the publication bans would be lifted.

Gomery’s Nov. 1, 2005, report is the first – and probably the more interesting – of two reports to come from his inquiry. The “who-knew-what-when” document will be followed by a “how-do-we-prevent-it-from-happening-again” report. That one is due in February 2006.

Prime Minister Martin has promised to call an election within 30 days of the release of that report.
 
I don't mean to make light of that situation, Duke, but take it from a citizen of a severely screwed-up nation: you could have it a lot worse.

The last sentence at least gives some small reason to hope that this scandal may ultimately result in positive change. That hasn't happen south of your border since Nixon resigned.
 
I hope Paul Martin doesnt win that election, if he does, then we are screwed, really screwed.
 
We're equally as screwed if Harper wins. And Jack Layton is a professional clown.

A minority gov't is the best thing that can happen.
 
[!--QuoteBegin-LooseCannon+Nov 2 2005, 04:21 PM--][div class=\'quotetop\']QUOTE(LooseCannon @ Nov 2 2005, 04:21 PM)[/div][div class=\'quotemain\'][!--QuoteEBegin--]Newfoundland screwed itself, just like Nova Scotia did.  I have no sympathy.
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Can you stress on that please. I know that joining confederation helped Newfoundland out but since then Canada has taken everything away from us. We aren't allowed to fish but people from other countries can come up and fish. In return, they give Canada certain privileges. This helps Canada out, but then they'll say there isn't enough fish for us. Newfoundland was a productive fishing province but Canada gave away all our rights.
 
[!--QuoteBegin-Wicker Man+Nov 2 2005, 04:02 PM--][div class=\'quotetop\']QUOTE(Wicker Man @ Nov 2 2005, 04:02 PM)[/div][div class=\'quotemain\'][!--QuoteEBegin--]Can you stress on that please. I know that joining confederation helped Newfoundland out but since then Canada has taken everything away from us. We aren't allowed to fish but people from other countries can come up and fish. In return, they give Canada certain privileges. This helps Canada out, but then they'll say there isn't enough fish for us. Newfoundland was a productive fishing province but Canada gave away all our rights.
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Like it o lump it, Newfoundland knew that offshore resources (ie fish, oil, etc) were federal jurisdiction when they entered Confederation. It could be argued that the collapse of the fisheries was bound to happen no matter what, and being IN Canada was safer for you boys on the Rock than being out.
I wrote an essay on this very topic two years ago:

A Perilous Blessing: Newfoundland's Fishery

I’s the b’y that builds the boat,
And I’s the b’y that sails ‘er.
I’s the b’y that catches the fish,
And brings ‘em home to Liza.


Newfoundland’s most famous folksong demonstrates the island’s historic relationship with the fishing industry. Newfoundland’s reliance on the cod fishery has shaped every aspect of the island’s culture, development, and relationship with the rest of the world. So important was the cod that, even now that the cod stocks have all but disappeared, the words “fish” and “cod” are synonymous in Newfoundland vocabulary. When a society relies on one resource for virtually everything, it takes an enormous risk. The impact of the resource becoming unavailable is devastating, and can put the future of the society at risk. This tragic case of “putting all the eggs in one basket” occurred in Newfoundland. From the first European exploration in the 15th century, the cod fishing has been Newfoundland’s primary industry. In 1992, amid sharp declines in stock sizes, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans placed a moratorium on all cod fishing, in the hopes of allowing the species to reassert itself. By April of 2003, they had not, and, while holding back tears, the Minister of Fisheries announced the total closure of the cod fishery indefinitely. Cod was no longer king.

A quick glance at a map of Newfoundland will show that the vast majority of human settlement is on the coast. This is not a random occurrence; rather it reflects how significant the cod fishery was to Newfoundland’s development. While many of the province’s coastal communities are small in size, they have long histories. Many Newfoundland settlements began as temporary landing areas for the fleets of Spanish, Portuguese, Basque, French, and, most importantly, English cod fishing boats. Originally, there was no need for permanent settlements, as the cod could be preserved and stored in the hold of the ships themselves. This process, known as wet fishing, required vast amounts of salt, which the English did not have in such bountiful supply as their other European competitors. This forced English fishermen to bring their catch ashore and preserve it in the “dry fishing” method, which was slower, but also consumed far less salt. As the facilities gradually improved on the island, it became viable for some English fishermen to settle permanently, establishing English sovereignty over the island.

Even though there were permanent settlers on Newfoundland, the primary (and for the first few decades, the only) industry was fishing. Agriculture was virtually non-existent, for the simple reason that it is impossible on most of the island. It is, after all, referred to as “The Rock” by its inhabitants for a reason. Even if Newfoundlanders had desired to earn their livings from the land, rather than the sea, it would have proven impossible on a large scale. The entire agricultural output of Newfoundland in the 1850’s, for example, was only a fraction of that of the comparatively small island of Cape Breton. Historian Sean Cadigan argues that it was this lack of agricultural potential which made Newfoundland so profoundly different from the other English settlements in Eastern North America.
The concentration of Newfoundlanders’ skills on fishing, the only career option open to most of the island’s inhabitants, and the over-abundance of the cod stocks caused the inhabitants’ collective “tool kit” of skills to stagnate. Because the cod seemed inexhaustible, for centuries there was no need to change the ways in which they were harvested. Sons could take up fishing just as their fathers and grandfathers had done with no concern about saturating the industry. Most human societies are lazy, and Newfoundlanders were no exception. Because fishing was “in their blood”, and offered a guaranteed living, almost no other industry developed on the island. This, of course, meant that most necessities had to be imported. A visitor to the island named Edward Chappell wrote of this situation in 1818 that “[In St. John’s] most commodities are extravagantly dear; particularly meat, poultry, and vegetables, as the town receives all its supplies of those articles from Nova Scotia.”

Newfoundlanders’ reliance on imported goods, naturally, created a small, but powerful, merchant class in the island’s principal town, St. John’s. Because the fishermen had little hard currency with which to purchase goods, the merchants allowed them to borrow against their expected earnings from the season’s cod catch. There were a few stipulations attached, of course. First, the borrowed credit was only redeemable at that particular merchant’s shop, guaranteeing a respectable profit. Second, the borrowing fisherman would have to agree to sell his catch to his creditor only, who would export it, making another profit. If the catch was poor and the fisherman unable to pay the merchant, he would go into debt, which tended to spiral out of control. This system of “double dipping” led Chappell to note that

“the slavery of the Newfoundland fishermen…is perpetuated by a system of the most flagrant and shameful extortion. Every merchant, the master of the fishery, is the huckster of his whole establishment….The prices are so enormous, that the original debt due…continues to rapidly increase….Thus, then, the Newfoundland fisherman toils from day to day…without the least
hope for the future.”


Undoubtedly, this class struggle was, at least partially, created by the lack of domestic industry in Newfoundland. There was little incentive to diversify the economy at first, and later, due to spiralling debts and influential merchants, it became impossible.

The problems faced by Newfoundlanders while the cod fishery flourished are minor in comparison to those faced after the collapse and closure of the industry. Both the provincial and federal governments have made numerous attempts since 1992 to get people out of the fishing industry and retrain them in different fields. In 1998 Human Resources Development Canada announced a $730,000,000 aid package, which was to ensure that fishers “have access to the necessary tools and resources to leave the fishery” and “provide practical work experience and training to develop new skills; mobility assistance to help people willing to move to find new employment opportunities.” In Newfoundland itself, for a myriad of reasons, most of the “make work” initiatives failed, or were only short-term projects. The only option available was to leave “The Rock” in search of an income. In the greatest internal migration in Canada’s history, thousands of Newfoundlanders have left the island to “head out West and work at the oil.” So great was this migration that between 1991, when the cod fishery collapsed, and 2001 the population of Newfoundland declined 9.8%. The population was literally decimated, and the out-migration has not yet ceased today. Other regions effected by the cod’s collapse, like Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, were not impacted as severely because they had diversified economies, unlike Newfoundland. In Newfoundland the fishery’s problems were those of the entire society.

An obvious risk taken by a society relying on one resource is that the resource could become over-exploited. The collapse of Newfoundland’s cod fishery is an excellent example of this. In hindsight, it is simple to criticise the fishers of the past 500 years and label them collectively as wasteful and greedy, racing to take all they could before their neighbours got a chance. This practical application of Garrett Hardin’s “Tragedy of the Commons” thesis is somewhat flawed, however. There was little evidence, until the mid 1970s, that the cod stocks were ever in any danger of running out. Indeed, figures from the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) seemed to show no discernable pattern in the catches. Therefore, the sudden decline in catches in the late 1980s and early 1990s took everyone by surprise. In response, the DFO placed a moratorium on all cod fisheries, immediately putting out of work 25% of Newfoundland’s population, and many more who were employed in secondary industries. The abruptness of the closure caused talk of conspiracy on the part of Ottawa. Certainly, blaming Ottawa for their problems is something Canadians in all provinces have done since Confederation. In this case, however, there may be some truth to those beliefs, and the people of Newfoundland may have a claim for compensation from Canada’s already cash-strapped federal government.

Historian Raymond Blake argues that Ottawa’s mismanagement of the Newfoundland fishery began in 1949 when the province entered Confederation. He writes that the Newfoundland fishery needed bold steps to be reformed into a sustainable industry, and that “Ottawa was clearly timid and refused to invest the necessary capital for fear of political repercussions from the Maritimes.” Certainly, Ottawa’s fear of creating regional jealousy played some role in its strategy for dealing with the East Coast fishery. The federal government could not subsidize more sustainable techniques in Newfoundland without doing the same in the Bay of Fundy or Northumberland Strait. Many Newfoundlanders believe that the fishery would have been better managed had Ottawa stayed away, that a “government dominated by central Canadians was technically incapable and mentally disinclined to assist Newfoundland.”

Ottawa’s “techno-utopian” approach to fisheries management has failed miserably. According to Alan Finlayson, this method of treating the ocean in a mechanical, paternalistic way began when Canada unilaterally extended its maritime boundary to 200 miles in 1977. Since nearly 85% of the yearly catch in this area had hitherto been taken by foreign (mostly Spanish and Icelandic) fishing boats , there was a general feeling of optimism among Canadian fishers and researchers alike. One fisheries expert, upon reflection of the time’s prevailing attitude was that

“They [DFO] had set out in 1977 with a very optimistic world view. That if you do thus and so, the stock will grow at this particular rate….The great excitement that came with the 200 mile economic zone and the possibilities that that opened up; finally we’ve got it under our control, finally we can manage it, finally we know what we’re doing, finally we have the power to do what we want to do.”

With enough technology and money, all of Newfoundland’s problems would be solved. This, of course, proved devastatingly untrue by the 1990s. Thousands of Newfoundlanders found themselves with no way to earn an income and there was little hope for the cod stocks’ recovery in the foreseeable future.

So disillusioned are some Newfoundlanders that they believe Ottawa intentionally harmed Newfoundland by deliberately mismanaging the cod fishery. Ex-fisherman Joe Oliver is a perfect example of this when he states angrily to a CBC reporter that “our government are [sic] as much to blame as any foreign fishing boat that ever put a [net] into the water.” Newfoundlanders were promised economic prosperity and social benefits in 1949 when they voted to join Canada. Five and a half decades later, they have mass unemployment and depopulation, with little hope for the future. Ottawa is an easy scapegoat for these problems, and there is evidence to support the theory that federal mismanagement was one of the key factors in the collapse of the fishery. The implications of such an interpretation are twofold. Firstly, Newfoundlanders’ confidence in the Canadian state could be damaged beyond repair, which could lead to a re-evaluation of the province’s place in Confederation. Secondly, perhaps more worrisome to some, a case for compensation against Ottawa on behalf of the people Newfoundland could be made, and if successful would set a dangerous precedent for similar cases across the country.

“The Northern Cod fishery was one of the basic socio-economic engines of Atlantic Canada and the fundamental raison d’etre of the Province of Newfoundland.” The island’s history is intertwined with that of the rise and fall of the cod. The consequences of exploiting one resource heavily, instead of many lightly, have been severe to Newfoundland. Many historians argue that the fisheries actually retarded Newfoundland’s development, which made its collapse all the more devastating. It is now apparent that the federal government’s policies for managing the cod fishery were seriously flawed, the repercussions of which continue to be felt in both Newfoundland the rest of Canada. Perhaps journalist Todd O’Brian best summed up Newfoundland’s relationship to the codfish as “a perilous blessing”.

Bibliography

Alexander, David. The Decay of Trade: An Economic History of the Newfoundland Saltfish Trade, 1935-1965. St. John’s: Memorial University of Newfoundland, 1977.

Barbour, Sam. Interviewed by Todd O’Brian. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.

Blake, Raymond. Canadians At Last: Canada Integrates Newfoundland As a Province. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994.

Cadigan, Sean T. Hope and Deception in Conception Bay: Merchant-Settler Relations in Newfoundland, 1785-1855. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995.

Chappell, Edward. “Voyage of HMS Rosamond to Newfoundland and the Southern Coast of Labrador, 1818.” In A Few Acres of Snow: Documents in Pre-Confederation Canadian History, ed. Thomas Thorner. Toronto: Broadview Press, 2003.

Conrad, Margaret and Alvin Finkel. History of the Canadian Peoples: Beginnings to 1867. 3rd ed. Toronto: Addison Wesley Longman, 2002.

Finlayson, Alan Christopher. Fishing For Truth: A Sociological Analysis of Northern Cod Stock Assessments From 1977 to 1990. St. John’s: I.S.E.R., 1994.

“Fishery restructuring and adjustment measures for the Atlantic Groundfish Industry.” Ottawa: Human Resources Development Canada, 1998. [cited 10 November, 2003] Available from [a href=\'http://www.hrdc-drhc.gc.ca/common/news/dept/9860.html\' target=\'_blank\']http://www.hrdc-drhc.gc.ca/common/news/dept/9860.html[/a].

Hardin, Garrett. “The Tragedy of the Commons.” Science 62 (1968): 1243-1248.

O’Flaherty, Patrick. Old Newfoundland: A History to 1843. St. John’s: Long Beach Press, 1999.

O’Brian, Todd. Ferryland. Documentary prepared for the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.

Oliver, Joe and Marjorie. Interviewed by Chris O’Neil-Yates. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 1998.

Sider, Gerald M. Cultural and Class in Anthropology and History: A Newfoundland Illustration. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.

Summers, Valerie. Regime Change in a Resource Economy: The Politics of Underdevelopment in Newfoundland since 1825. St. John’s: Breakwater, 1994.

Thibault, The Honourable Robert. Press Conference Covered by Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 2003.

“To the Last Fish: The Codless Sea.” St. John’s: Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 2003. [cited 20 November, 2003] Available from [a href=\'http://stjohns.cbc.ca/features/CodFisheries\' target=\'_blank\']http://stjohns.cbc.ca/features/CodFisheries[/a].
 
Duke, at least your country has a government.

Germany is bound to trace the steps of Weimar if it continues like this. And you know what that means.
 
And Canada damn near went to war with Spain about defending our fisheries, don't forget.
 
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